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THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCE ACCESS 
Lee Anne Fennell 
The Coasean insight that transaction costs stand between the world as we know it and an 
ideal of perfect efficiency has provided generations of law and economics scholars with an 
analytic North Star.  But for legal scholars interested in the efficiency implications of 
property arrangements, transaction costs turn out to constitute an unhelpful category.  
Transaction costs are related to property rights in unstable and contested ways, and they 
comprise a heterogeneous set of impediments, not all of which are amenable to cost-effective 
reduction through law.  Treating them as focal confuses the cause of our difficulties in 
structuring access to resources (positive transaction costs) with the solution to the problem 
presented by a world featuring scarce resources and positive transaction costs.  A broader 
notion of resource access costs, appropriately subdivided, can correct problems of 
overinclusion, underinclusion, and insufficient specification in the transaction cost concept.  
The resulting analytic clarity will allow property theorists to contribute more usefully to 
solving resource problems. 
INTRODUCTION 
n The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase firmly installed transaction 
costs at the center of the economic analysis of law.1  The potential for 
these costs to inconveniently interpose themselves between the world as 
we know it and an ideal of perfect efficiency has provided generations of 
law and economics scholars with an analytic North Star.  But the relation-
ship between property rights and transaction costs is a fundamentally un-
stable one.  Property rights seem to be an antecedent to transactions,2 yet 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  Max Pam Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Research Scholar, University of Chi-
cago Law School.  Prior drafts of this Article circulated under the title “Resource Access Costs.”  For 
helpful comments, I thank Abraham Bell, Yun-chien Chang, Daniel Cole, Hanoch Dagan, David Dana, 
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Nestor Davidson, Harold Demsetz, Peter DiCola, Daniel Kelly, Ronit Levine-
Schnur, Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Richard McAdams, Jonathan Nash, Ariel Porat, Carol Rose, Chris-
topher Serkin, Joseph Singer, Henry Smith, Lior Strahilevitz, Stewart Sterk, Avishalom Tor, Eyal Zamir, 
anonymous reviewers for the American Law and Economics Association, and participants in the 2012 
Property Works in Progress Conference at Fordham Law School, Hebrew University’s Private and 
Commercial Law Workshop, Northwestern University’s Law and Economics Colloquium, and faculty 
workshops at Notre Dame School of Law and the University of Chicago Law School.  I also thank the 
Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan Faculty Fund for financial support. 
 1 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).  The Coase Theorem holds 
that when transaction costs are zero, an efficient result will be reached, regardless of the initial assign-
ment of legal entitlements.  See id. at 8.  
 2 See, e.g., id. at 8 (“It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not for 
damage caused since without the establishment of this initial delimitation of rights there can be no mar-
ket transactions to transfer and recombine them.”); Douglas W. Allen, Transaction Costs, in 1 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 893, 898 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) 
(“Given that trade is the transfer of property rights, there can be no trade (and hence no gains from 
trade) in the absence of property rights.”). 
I 
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property can also be viewed as an invention necessitated by transaction 
costs,3 or as an input into the magnitude and composition of transaction 
costs.4  To think about property and transaction costs together, then, is to 
confront a conceptual Möbius strip.5  Isolating and addressing transaction 
costs turns out to be a slippery business that can interfere with the goal of 
structuring resource access optimally.6  For property theorists, it is the 
wrong enterprise. 
Transaction costs are not always, and not uniquely, problematic.  Like 
other ways of structuring access to resources, transactions are costly to 
produce.7  Because making transactions cheaper or less necessary con-
sumes resources that might be better deployed elsewhere, we cannot infer 
inefficiency from high transaction costs alone.8  Nor are costly transactions 
the only source of inefficiency worth addressing; the costs of keeping re-
sources in place (through property rights or otherwise) must also be con-
sidered.  The important question is whether legal changes can cost-
effectively improve resource access.  That inquiry proves to be broader in 
some ways, narrower in other ways, and more finely specified than the 
usual focus on transaction costs allows.9 
This Article argues that transaction costs do not comprise a useful cate-
gory for legal scholars interested in the efficiency implications of property 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 3 See Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law 
Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 31 n.92 (2012) (“[I]n a zero transaction cost world, we would 
not need property rights at all.”); Brian Angelo Lee & Henry E. Smith, The Nature of  
Coasean Property, 59 INT’L REV. ECON. 145, 148 (2012) (“The institution of property is itself a mech-
anism that enables us to avoid these [transaction] costs.”); see also infra notes 88–90 and accompany-
ing text. 
 4 See, e.g., Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Endogenous Transaction Costs 8 (Jan. 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
 5 Some definitions of transaction costs explicitly embrace this entwinement with property rights.  
See Allen, supra note 2, at 897 (discussing property rights and transaction costs as “fundamentally in-
terlinked” and “two sides of the same coin” on the “property right” vision of transaction costs). 
 6 The ultimate aim is optimal resource use, but I focus here on the law’s role in structuring access 
as a proxy for use. Some complications will be discussed below.  See infra section IV.D, TAN 187–191. 
 7 See HAROLD DEMSETZ, FROM ECONOMIC MAN TO ECONOMIC SYSTEM 109–10 (2008).  Le-
gal changes may be able to reduce the cost of inputs into that production process, but should be pursued 
only when the cost reductions are worth the price.  See infra section II.B, TAN 119–144. 
 8 Coase himself emphasized that external effects do not necessarily signal an inefficiency warrant-
ing intervention.  See Coase, supra note 1, at 18.  Harold Demsetz would extend Coase’s point to apply 
regardless of the presence and magnitude of transaction costs, on the ground that too-costly transactions 
are efficiently left undone.  See Harold Demsetz, The Problem of Social Cost: What Problem? A Cri-
tique of the Reasoning of A.C. Pigou and R.H. Coase, 7 REV. L. & ECON. 1, 10 (2011).  Pierre Schlag 
has argued that several points Coase made about externalities could be made in an identically structured 
manner about transaction costs.  See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1661, 1665 (1989).  Although my points and Demsetz’s are different from Schlag’s, they find 
common ground in this observation. 
 9 Although the problem with the transaction cost category is entangled with definitional disputes, it 
is not ultimately terminological in nature.  See infra section I.B, TAN 41–84. 
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arrangements.10  Treating them as focal confuses the cause of our difficul-
ties in structuring access to resources (positive transaction costs) with the 
solution to the problem that a world featuring scarce resources and positive 
transaction costs presents.  To see the point, observe what the counterfac-
tual zero transaction cost world does for us.  Certainly, it ensures that the 
“things” that property scholars focus their attention on — entitlements to 
emit, pieces of land, water rights, and so on — reach their highest-valuing 
users.  But the zero transaction cost assumption also, and crucially, means 
that we need not worry about spending too many or too few resources on 
the transactions that accomplish these feats; all transactions are free.  
Likewise, we need not worry in the zero transaction cost world about 
keeping things in place when their current possessor is the highest valuer; 
the necessary transactions to prevent transfers will also be costless. 
As soon as we introduce positive transaction costs into a world of re-
source scarcity, we must worry not only about thing-misallocation but also 
about resources being misallocated to structure access to those things.  To 
focus single-mindedly on reducing or overcoming transaction costs is to 
miss the significance of the other resource access structures that their pres-
ence has necessitated, and the costs associated with those structures.  For 
example, the appealing idea that we might reduce transaction costs through 
thoughtful entitlement design must be tempered with attention to the con-
verse possibility: that we might pay too much, in the currency of entitle-
ment design, to achieve transaction cost reductions.11 
There are three basic reasons that transaction costs comprise a poor 
category around which to organize legal interventions12 or against which to 
judge the efficacy of different entitlement design choices.  First, the cate-
gory (at least as typically invoked) is underinclusive in ways that go to the 
heart of the connection between property rights and transactions.  The sec-
ond problem is overinclusiveness.  Not all of the costs that are thrown to-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 10 I am not the first to question the significance of transaction costs.  See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, 
Ownership and the Externality Problem, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND 
LAW 282, 284 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesny eds., 2003) (“The approach I present here ar-
gues against the emphasis given by Coase, and now by the profession, to transaction cost.”); Schlag, 
supra note 8, at 1699 (“To treat the presence, absence, and identity of transaction costs as the predicate 
determination for deciding whether to create or supplant actual pricing markets is wrongheaded.”).  
 11 For instance, the cost of making riparian water rights more transaction-friendly could swamp the 
gains from the newly enabled trades.  I thank David Dana for this example. 
 12 I use the term “interventions” in this Article to designate new, targeted efforts to improve re-
source access outside of ordinary market processes.  My use of the term is not meant to suggest that 
there exists an alternative arrangement in which government intervention is wholly absent.  Clearly, the 
government is always involved in matters of resource access, even if only to provide institutional sup-
port for the operation of markets or to enforce (or adjudicate) property rights.  See A.W. Brian Simpson, 
Coase v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 61 (1996) (“When [Coase] instances ‘inaction’ as 
one possible reaction to the problem of social cost what he must really mean is leaving the matter to the 
common law.  Since courts cannot simply wash their hands of disputes, this never means doing noth-
ing.”). 
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gether in the transaction cost bucket are equally amenable to legal inter-
ventions, nor do all of them signal inefficiencies in the allocation of re-
sources.  The third problem relates to insufficient specification of impedi-
ments to optimal resource allocation.  In some cases, both nonowners and 
owners agree that a transfer (or nontransfer) should take place and need 
only coordinate over carrying it out at the going rate,13 while in other cas-
es they are in conflict over whether the resource should be transferred, or 
how the surplus from a transfer should be split up.14  These are different 
sorts of problems that call for different solutions. 
In some ways, these are familiar points.  It is already understood that 
all ways of structuring access to resources are costly.15  Transaction costs 
can be (and have been) defined to include the costs of property rights16 — 
although this is more of a conceptual stretch than proponents of the ap-
proach have acknowledged.17  There are large literatures that address vari-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 The “going rate” for a nontransfer is zero, while the “going rate” in competitive markets is the 
(no-haggle) competitively determined market price.  In settings where there is no “going  
rate” — that is, where the parties must decide on their own how to divide surplus — conflict over sur-
plus division may be a significant impediment. 
 14 Some scholars have flagged this heterogeneity in transaction costs.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric 
Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE 
L.J. 1027, 1036 (1995) (“[A]n overarching ‘Coasean’ theme of our analysis is that the type of transac-
tion cost matters: It is inadequate to think of ‘transaction costs’ as some sort of composite good whose 
components imply similar policies.”); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 
2175, 2184 (1997) (distinguishing “Type I Transaction Costs,” which she defines as “difficulties that 
may result from having to find and assemble numerous or indistinctly defined interested parties, the 
costs that come prior to bargaining altogether,” from “Type II Transaction Costs,” which are “the im-
pediments that come after bargaining begins, from parties who are close-mouthed, poker-faced, strate-
gically bargaining misanthropes”); Richard N. Langlois, The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs, 
27 ORG. STUD. 1389, 1389–90 (2006) (distinguishing transaction costs associated with “opportunism” 
and “incentive misalignment” from standard neoclassical  “frictions” that are analogous to transporta-
tion costs).  Other scholars have moved certain conflict costs — notably the costs of strategic behavior 
— outside of the transaction cost framework altogether.  See infra section I.B.1, TAN 48–66.  What the 
analysis here adds to these earlier taxonomic moves is not just a matter of framing and emphasis; I also 
locate the conflict-versus-coordination distinction in a broader set of resource access impediments that 
encompasses the costs involved in keeping resources in place as well as the costs of transacting over 
them.   
 15 See, e.g., THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 102 (1990) 
(“The firm, the market, and the legal system are all costly social arrangements.”); Allen, supra note 2, 
at 895 (“[A]ll methods of allocating resources have costs and benefits and no single mechanism works 
for free and dominates all others . . . .”). 
 16 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 2, at 898–99 (observing that commonly used understandings of trans-
action costs “implicitly recognize the threat of appropriation or theft” and stating that “[w]hen property 
rights are protected and maintained in any context, transaction costs exist”).  Yet Allen’s complaints 
about the “redundant” use of phrases like “zero transaction costs and complete property rights,” id. at 
899 (internal quotation mark omitted), suggest this definition has not won universal acceptance. 
 17 A thought experiment shows how aggressive this reading of transaction costs really is.  Suppose 
we were to reframe the Coase Theorem around an assumption of zero transfer resistance costs, rather 
than zero transaction costs, in a world without any private property rights at all.  If those who value a 
resource most highly can costlessly hold onto it, but others cannot, efficient outcomes would eventually 
follow if we make assumptions about background transfer mechanisms that are as strong as the assump-
tions that Coase implicitly made about background property rights.  Had costless transfer resistance 
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ous aspects of the cost-minimization problem associated with structuring 
resource access, including work on the theory of the firm and problems of 
incomplete contracting.18  In the property field, work on the optimal scope 
and form of land ownership has taken to heart lessons from the theory of 
the firm in balancing internal management and external transactions.19  
The relationship between the specification of property rights and the costs 
of transacting has received attention as well, with literatures developing 
around divided and incomplete property rights.20  Scholars have also rec-
ognized important differences among types of transaction costs.21 
Yet these insights, threaded through different economic and legal  
literatures, have not been brought together in a way that allows for their 
intuitive use in legal contexts.  Legal scholars regularly invoke the Coase 
Theorem’s central term in law reviews,22 workshops, and classrooms, but 
they usually do so without specifying what they mean by it, much less 
what assumptions they are making about the surrounding property re-
gime.23  This reflexive resort to transaction costs keeps legal scholars, and 
especially property scholars, from building as usefully as they might on 
existing insights.  Property theory today is alive with debate on core ques-
tions of entitlement design: whether property rules or liability rules should 
dominate, whether an exclusion- or thing-based vision of property should 
trump the bundle-of-rights metaphor, whether fixed tenure menus aid or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
been Coase’s frame, we might now be debating whether the costs of markets or other means of moving 
resources in a more or less costly fashion were “really” transfer resistance costs, just as we now debate 
whether the institutions that provide transfer resistance (property rights) “really” represent transaction 
costs. 
 18 See generally, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937); San-
ford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and 
Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the 
Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990).  New Institutional Economics uses a broad under-
standing of transaction costs to examine questions of institutional design within firms and other organi-
zational structures.  See generally, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 
(1975). 
 19 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & 
PROC.) 347, 354–59 (1967), Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993). 
 20 See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 14; Antonio Nicita et al., Towards a Theory of Incomplete 
Property Rights (May 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1067466; see also Amnon Lehavi, The Dynamic Law of Property: Theorizing the Role of Le-
gal Standards, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 81 (2010); Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, Hold-Up and Externali-
ty: The Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Rights, 59 INT’L REV. ECON. 157 (2012). 
 21 See supra note 14. 
 22 According to LexisNexis, in 2012 alone at least 965 law review articles included the term “trans-
action cost” or “transaction costs” (in March 2013, the search “transaction costs and date geq 
(01/01/2012) and date leq (12/31/2012)” in the U.S. & Canadian Law Review database produced 965 
hits). 
 23 There have, however, been some careful attempts to locate a fixed starting point in comparing the 
effects of different institutional arrangements.  See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1326 n.34 (building on 
earlier work by Frank Michelman and setting out “three foundational entitlements” that are treated as 
exogenous in comparing land institutions). 
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impede efficiency, and so on.  These conversations inevitably circle around 
to transaction costs, but because the term is confusingly and indeterminate-
ly bound up in the very enterprise at hand — designing entitlements — it 
can offer little guidance. 
In place of a single term — transaction costs — which carries a mean-
ing that is opaque, contested, and unstably related to the design of entitle-
ments, we need a set of concepts that will clarify the legal scholar’s task of 
improving access to resources.  As a first step in that direction, I propose 
the umbrella term of “resource access costs” to designate the full range of 
costs associated with structuring access to resources.  Significantly, both 
the costs of completing resource transfers24 and the costs of resisting them 
must be taken into account, along with the costs of thing-misallocations 
that occur when either set of costs becomes prohibitively large. 
Creating this wide class of costs is only an interim step toward address-
ing concrete resource problems, however.  Indeed, one function of the ex-
ercise is to emphasize the potentially unbounded nature of resource access 
costs, and to shift attention to the constructive task of identifying areas 
where law can cost-effectively improve resource access.  Accordingly, I 
draw distinctions that address the problems of overinclusion and insuffi-
cient specification flagged above.  I focus on two important subsets — 
conflict costs and coordination costs — each of which presents distinct dif-
ficulties, corresponds to different features of an entitlement regime, and re-
sponds to different interventions.  I also make a cross-cutting distinction 
between resource access costs that represent unsolved collective action 
problems (such as the obstacles neighbors face in trying to buy out a facto-
ry’s entitlement to pollute) and those that do not (such as the cost of paper 
and ink, or the time it takes a human being to read a page of text). 
This approach has two main payoffs.  First, recognizing the full range 
of resource access costs challenges conventional thinking surrounding 
transaction costs.  Efforts to reduce or avoid transaction costs will often be 
misguided.  Indeed, transaction costs may at times be inefficiently low, 
producing too many transfers of resources to higher-valuing users.25  Re-
framing the relevant set of costs thus clarifies the basis for, and limits on, 
legal intervention. 
A second set of payoffs sounds in property theory.  Property rights are 
powerful mechanisms for paving the way or blocking the path between re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 I focus in this Article on “transfers” rather than “transactions” to make clear that nonmarket 
transfers are included. 
 25 My argument here is very different from the argument about “too low” transaction costs put for-
ward in David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transac-
tion Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 99 (2005).  The authors refer to 
instances where transaction costs are prohibitive, and hence not incurred.  In my analysis, these unin-
curred costs are still transaction costs.  See infra section I.C, TAN 85–91 (discussing latent and realized 
transaction costs).   
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sources and high-valuing users.  Meaningful evaluation of these arrange-
ments requires moving past the property scholar’s tendency to focus on the 
primary “thing” in view when evaluating efficiency.  That focus draws at-
tention to impediments to the thing’s efficient allocation but away from the 
efficient allocation of resources that might be used (or not) to carry out 
transfers, stop them, or to make them less expensive.  Likewise, property 
scholars concerned with transaction costs often talk past each other; some 
focus their attention on features in entitlement design that ease coordina-
tion, while others focus on dampening the conflict costs associated with 
private information.26  A clarifying vocabulary can improve the quality of 
this dialogue and recenter attention on the necessary design tradeoffs. 
The analysis proceeds in four parts.  Part I discusses shortfalls in the 
transaction cost concept.  Part II constructs the category of resource access 
costs and shows how it reframes transaction cost problems.  Part III shows 
how the resource access cost category can be refined and subdivided to in-
form legal interventions directed at resource access improvements.  Part IV 
considers some objections and extensions. 
I.  TRANSACTION COST TROUBLE 
The Coase Theorem, as it is taught in law school classrooms, stands for 
the idea that parties will bargain to an efficient result regardless of the 
law’s initial assignment of entitlements if transaction costs are zero.27  
Students are then reminded that, as Coase well recognized, transaction 
costs are not zero, and indeed are routinely large.  Hence, the initial as-
signment of legal entitlements can and does matter for efficiency.  This 
formulation is fairly uncontroversial as far as it goes, and the takeaway 
lesson that law matters after all should be reassuring to law students and 
their professors.  Nonetheless, the Coase Theorem often has the side effect 
of turning transaction costs into objects of resentment.28  If only they were 
zero!  Why must they be so large?  Isn’t there anything anyone can do 
about them, these destroyers of efficiency? 
This negative attention on transaction costs has led to some fruitful ad-
vances, but also to some wrong turns and dead ends.  Understanding what 
the law should or should not do about transaction costs has been compli-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 Carol Rose makes this point when she observes that Ian Ayres and Eric Talley appear to have 
concerned themselves with “Type II” rather than “Type I” transaction costs.  Rose, supra note 14, at 
2184.   
 27 For example, the University of Chicago Law School included this summary of the Coase Theo-
rem in the planner it distributed to law students at the beginning of last school year: “Simply stated: in 
a world where there are no transaction costs, an efficient outcome will occur regardless of the initial 
allocation of rights.”  UNIV. OF CHI. LAW SCH., THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL 2011–
12 SOURCEBOOK AND PLANNER 21. 
 28 See, e.g., Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 142 (1979) (“[I]n 
the theory of externalities, transaction costs are the root of all evil.”). 
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cated by the absence of any agreed-upon definition of the term or any sys-
tematic way of ordering the heterogeneous phenomena that answer to that 
name.  Behind a raft of terminological debates and taxonomic shortfalls 
lies a deep and often unacknowledged confusion about how transaction 
costs relate to property rights.  As a result, a focus on transaction costs — 
however defined — misdirects property scholars.  The category does not 
align well with justifications for legal intervention. 
There are three problems with using the transaction cost category as a 
guide to identifying inefficiencies that might call for changes in law or pol-
icy: underinclusiveness, overinclusiveness, and insufficiently specified 
subcategories.  Although these problems are entangled with definitional 
debates, they cannot be resolved through semantics alone.  Section A ex-
amines a problem of overinclusiveness suggested by Harold Demsetz’s cri-
tique of Coase’s emphasis on transaction costs.  Section B turns to a set of 
definitional debates about the breadth and content of the transaction cost 
category.  Resolving these debates in favor of widening the transaction 
cost tent can mitigate underinclusiveness, but only by exacerbating the 
problem of insufficiently specified subcategories.  Section C pushes harder 
on the problems of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness by focusing 
on unexpended transaction costs that manifest themselves latently in socie-
tal structures and resource misallocations. 
A.  The Demsetzian Critique 
Over the past decade, Demsetz has produced a significant body of law 
and economics scholarship that, among its other contributions, challenges 
certain aspects of Coase’s analysis and conclusions in The Problem of So-
cial Cost.  One element of that critique goes to the relationship between 
transaction costs and economic inefficiency.  While agreeing with Coase 
that a zero transaction cost world would produce allocative efficiency, 
Demsetz views it as deeply mistaken to equate positive transaction costs, 
or rational reactions to them, with inefficiency.  In a representative pas-
sage, Demsetz analogizes transaction costs to transportation costs: 
Imagine a railroad capable of shipping goods between two firms.  The railroad 
incurs cost if it does this, and the cost may be so high that the shipment does 
not occur (and, instead, as Coase wrote in ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937), the 
would-be receiving firm chooses to rely on in-house production of the good 
that would have been shipped were there no transport cost).  No inefficiency 
has been created if the shipment does not take place under these circumstanc-
es, for the implied gain from making the shipment is less than the cost of do-
ing so.  But, pray tell, we reach the same conclusion if we change ‘shipment 
cost’ to transaction cost.  So, we had better re-examine Coase’s reasoning 
about positive transaction cost.29 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 Demsetz, supra note 8, at 7. 
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At one level, this illustration makes the simple but powerful point that 
everything costs something, and the cost of transacting over resources is 
no different in kind from the cost of running machinery or of moving 
things from place to place.30  We expect rational actors to make decisions 
based on what things cost, given existing technologies and physical con-
straints.  It is a mistake to call the results inefficient if they cannot be oth-
erwise, or cannot be otherwise at a cost that is less than the identified 
suboptimalities themselves. 
So far so good.  But digging deeper into the example raises the ques-
tion of why the goods that one firm needs are located a train’s journey 
away from that firm.  The legal analogue, of course, is the assignment of 
rights to parties that are not the highest-valuing users of those rights.  The 
movement of rights, like the movement of goods, only comes into play 
when a starting point has separated these elements from the place where 
they would do the most good.  Because getting them to that place costs 
more than it is worth, Demsetz is right to say that, given our starting point, 
the results are efficient.  But we need not take the starting point as a given.  
Demsetz recognizes this when he notes (citing Coase) that the goods might 
be manufactured on site rather than moved over from elsewhere.31 
Not only can private parties use a change in ownership structure to al-
ter the starting point, but the law itself can decide how entitlements will be 
allocated in the first instance.  Demsetz recognizes this as well.  Indeed, he 
locates the inefficiency in Coase’s account in the law’s misallocation of le-
gal entitlements, not in positive transaction costs.32  To legal scholars, 
Demsetz’s insistence that the law, not the market, is to blame for ineffi-
ciencies will sound neither novel nor surprising.  We are already occupa-
tionally inclined to think law is the most likely culprit, or at least the most 
tractable margin for seeking improvement.  Instead, legal scholars’ interest 
in transaction costs is very much like what our interest in transportation 
costs might be if the government were to propose allocating location-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 30 Elsewhere Demsetz describes transactions as products like any other:  
Transaction cost is no different from other costs in regard to determining which good or ser-
vice is to be produced.  If the cost of producing a hydrogen-fueled automobile exceeds the 
price that people are willing to pay for the vehicle, efficient resource allocation requires that 
this vehicle not be produced.  Similarly, efficient resource allocation requires that a transac-
tion not take place if the cost of producing the transaction exceeds the price that people are 
willing to pay to engage in exchange.  We do not shout “inefficiency!” if the vehicle is not 
produced.  Why proclaim inefficiency if a transaction is not produced? 
DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 109–10. 
 31 Demsetz, supra note 8, at 7.   
 32 E.g., DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 111–12.  Demsetz focuses on Coase’s statement that when 
transaction costs are higher than the gains from transacting, “the initial delimitation of legal rights does 
have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates.”  Id. (quoting Coase, supra 
note 1, at 16) (internal quotation marks omitted).  As Demsetz convincingly argues, the economic sys-
tem does not operate with any less efficiency owing to positive transaction costs; instead, it “does the 
best that can possibly be done” under the circumstances.  Id. at 112. 
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specific goods by random helicopter drop.  Positive transportation costs 
would make this a poor way of getting goods physically into the hands of 
those who value them most highly.  But if transportation costs were zero 
(the goods could frictionlessly glide to the places they are most valued), 
we would not fret about the distribution mechanism. 
On this account, transaction costs help to identify instances in which 
the law’s allocation mechanism is likely to be worth the cost of worrying 
about.  Transaction costs are thus different in kind from other sorts of 
costs, like burning cleaner coal or moving goods around from place to 
place.33  And they are different in kind for a reason Demsetz himself em-
phasizes: they are occasioned by an act occurring outside of the market 
system in the court’s assignment of entitlements.34  Legal scholars may, 
therefore, have good reason to pay special attention to transaction costs, 
even if economists have no reason to treat them differently from any other 
cost.  High transaction costs might suggest that courts and other legal insti-
tutions should try harder to assign entitlements efficiently in the first place, 
or that legal scholars might work on finding other ways to lower, counter, 
or sidestep transaction costs. 
Yet each of these measures should be undertaken only if it is worth it, 
which requires a comparison of all the possible ways of dealing with the 
misallocation, from letting it be, to resolving it with a more accurate initial 
assignment, to altering the underlying entitlement design, to applying some 
other transaction cost reduction or avoidance technique.  Guido Calabresi 
makes just this point in observing that the costs of both transactions and 
transaction substitutes must be considered in deciding what to do about 
misallocations.35  Demsetz does not make such comparisons because he 
takes the legal system (and the entitlements and entitlement assignments it 
produces) as given.36  Once the legal system itself is considered up for 
grabs, as it is for law and economics scholars, we must ask additional 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 33 These are two of the examples that Demsetz uses in arguing that transaction costs are no different 
from other costs.  See Demsetz, supra note 8, at 7, 10. 
 34 See, e.g., id. at 8–9. 
 35 See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules — A Comment, 
11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 69 (1968) (observing that “transactions do cost money,” and that “substitutes for 
transactions, be they taxation, liability rules, or structural rules, are also not costless”).  Calabresi goes 
on to explain: “Whatever device is used, the question must be asked: Are its costs worth the benefits in 
better resource allocations it brings about or have we instead approached a false optimum by a series of 
games which are not worth the candles used?”  Id.  This general approach is consistent with Calabresi’s 
later work on the costs of accidents, which also powerfully applies the insight that problems are only 
worth solving if the solution is cheaper than the problem itself.  See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, 
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
 36 See Lee & Smith, supra note 3, at 150 (“Key to Demsetz’s argument is that law, the legal system, 
and their effects on initial entitlements are treated as given, as they are to mainstream economists.”).  
Demsetz does, however, consider (without endorsing) the possibility that the court system could be run 
on market principles.  If courts were dependent “on revenues secured from petitioners who purchase 
their services and decisions,” he argues, “ownership of a disputed resource would never go to the peti-
tioner who is less capable of maximizing value from its use.”  Demsetz, supra note 8, at 9. 
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questions to determine whether high transaction costs indicate inefficiency.  
Consider first the initial separation of the resource and the actor.  After tak-
ing into account the incentive effects of different allocation methods and 
other normative constraints that may cabin allocation choices, there may 
be no cost-effective way to get the resource into the hands of the actor in 
the first instance.  Where these conditions obtain, we might well be skepti-
cal about whether there is any efficiency problem in the picture at all, de-
spite the presence of prohibitively high transaction costs. 
What about the prospect of lowering the transaction costs themselves?  
If we could invent a faster train, so to speak, costs that were initially pro-
hibitive could fall low enough to be worth incurring.  We cannot assume 
that the absence of a faster train is a product of inefficiency, however, 
without knowing why the faster train is not running.  Does it cost more to 
invent, produce, and maintain than it is worth?  Have political factions 
conspired to keep it out of production, or does the law fail to grant suffi-
cient returns to the inventor?37  In other words, the standard Chicago asser-
tion that there is no cost-effective faster train (because if there were, we 
would all be riding on it already) depends on assumptions about the pro-
cesses (markets and politics) that produce trains.  Likewise, if the magni-
tude of transaction costs depends not on the interplay of competitive mar-
kets but rather on governmental responses (or the lack thereof) to 
collective action problems, the Chicago retort would hold considerably less 
sway.  But is that the case?  The answer depends on just what we mean by 
transaction costs. 
Demsetz defines transaction costs in a manner that is much narrower 
than most property rights theorists use the term.38  This definitional move 
frames both his criticism of the central place given to transaction costs in 
Coasean analysis39 and his suggestion that “ownership costs” should re-
ceive more attention.40  Definitions aside, his critique flags an important 
problem of overinclusiveness insofar as he observes that transaction costs 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 Even if we get an affirmative answer to one of these questions, it is still not clear we can claim 
inefficiency.  We would need to compare the costs of altering the legal or political landscape in ways 
that would be more conducive to the production of the fast trains with the gains those changes will de-
liver. 
 38 See Allen, supra note 2, at 903–04; Lee & Smith, supra note 3, at 150. 
 39 DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 106–17.  See generally Demsetz, supra note 8; Demsetz, supra note 
10. 
 40 See, e.g., DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 116 (classifying free-rider problems as “ownership costs” 
rather than “transaction costs”); see also Demsetz, supra note 8, at 5 (discussing the “positive cost of 
ownership” in connection with the existence and enforceability of private property rights); Demsetz, 
supra note 10, at 284 (describing his approach as one that not only “argues against the emphasis given 
by Coase, and now by the profession, to transaction cost” but “also argues that more emphasis should 
be given to the conditions of ownership”); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The 
Competition Between Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S653, S655–56 (2002) 
(observing that Coase assumed the existence of private property rights, whereas Demsetz’s own work 
examined the development of those rights). 
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may not signal inefficiencies.  This problem of overinclusiveness is not 
addressed (although it is obscured) by expanding the transaction cost cate-
gory to encompass elements that map better onto the case for legal inter-
vention.  A broader definition can indeed bring Demsetz’s “ownership 
costs” (and much else) within the transaction cost tent, but as long as it 
leaves murky how these elements relate to each other and to legal inter-
ventions, the confusion and incompleteness in the analysis of resource al-
location will persist. 
B.  Contested Definitional Terrain 
The definition of transaction costs has been a source of disagreement 
and confusion among scholars.41  In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase 
himself did not use the term “transaction cost”42 but instead referred to the 
“costs involved in carrying out market transactions,” which he described as 
follows: 
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is 
that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on 
what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the 
contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the 
contract are being observed, and so on.43 
Later, Coase embraced Carl Dahlman’s breakdown of transaction costs into 
“search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, [and] polic-
ing and enforcement costs.”44  Scholars have subsequently developed a va-
riety of other transaction cost taxonomies.45 
There is broad agreement that the costs people incur to get together, 
communicate with each other, and draw up and police contracts represent 
transaction costs.  But the status of some other elements is contested.  In-
deed, Douglas Allen has observed a sharp dichotomy in the use of the 
term, with the “neoclassical” literature taking a much narrower view of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 41 See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16 (1982) (“The meaning of trans-
action costs is not well-standardized in the literature.”). 
 42 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE L.J. 611, 612 
n.8 (1989) (making this observation). 
 43 Coase, supra note 1, at 15. 
 44 R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 6 (1988) (quoting Dahlman, supra note 
28, at 148) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ellickson, supra note 42, at 614–15 (character-
izing this taxonomy as dividing up transaction costs temporally, based on whether they are sustained 
before, during, or after the bargaining process). 
 45 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 42, at 615–16 (breaking up transaction costs along functional 
lines into “get-together costs,” “decision and execution costs,” and “information costs”); Langlois, su-
pra note 14, at 1392 fig.1 (breaking down transaction costs in several ways, including whether the costs 
are “fixed,” “a function of time,” or “a function of number of exchanges or volume of trade”); Rose, 
supra note 14, at 2184 (defining and distinguishing “Type I” and “Type II” transaction costs). 
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transaction costs than the “property rights” literature.46  On the narrowest 
account (the one to which Demsetz subscribes), transaction costs are lim-
ited to the cost of using the price system under conditions of perfect com-
petition47 — a state of the world that leaves no room for haggling and that 
presupposes the existence of property rights.  Other accounts, including 
those used by most scholars concerned with property rights, are considera-
bly broader. 
Three factors relevant to the law’s treatment of entitlements have been 
variously welcomed in, booted out, or ignored altogether in various defini-
tions of transaction costs: the costs of strategic bargaining behavior, the 
costs of defining and enforcing property rights, and the costs of internal 
governance within property holdings or firms.  Although including these 
contested costs helps to address problems of underinclusiveness in the 
transaction cost category, it increases the need for useful subcategories by 
introducing greater heterogeneity among costs. 
1.  Strategic Bargaining Behavior. — Some of the most significant and 
troublesome barriers to exchange involve strategic behavior.  Two familiar 
subspecies of strategic behavior are “free riding,” which involves under-
stating the price one is willing to pay, and “holding out,” which involves 
overstating the price one is willing to accept.48  In addition to these prob-
lems, which are usually associated with multi-player scenarios,49 there are 
problems of bilateral monopoly in which struggles over the division of 
surplus can take the form of a Chicken Game.50  These strategic impedi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 46 See Allen, supra note 2, at 893–904.  The neoclassical view is exemplified by Demsetz, who 
treats transaction costs as nothing more or less than the costs of using the market.  See id. at 903–04; 
see also Schlag, supra note 8, at 1674–76 (discussing definitional disputes). 
 47 See DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 107. 
 48 Individuals who accurately represent their idiosyncratically high reservation prices are sometimes 
dubbed “holdouts,” but I prefer Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegleman’s alternative term 
“holdins.”  Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals 
in Law and Economics, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 128–29 (2004).  An extreme version of (true) holding 
out involves misrepresenting not only the magnitude of one’s reservation price but also its sign — as 
where a terrible musician, whose sounds hurt even his own ears, will play in order to be paid to stop.  
See, e.g., Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L REV. 1641 (2011); see also Harold Dem-
setz, Theoretical Efficiency in Pollution Control: Comment on Comments, 9 W. ECON. J. 444 (1971); 
Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 22–25 (1972). 
 49 Free riding arises in contexts where more than one person is in a position to fund a good from 
which other individuals cannot be cost-effectively excluded.  Holding out is often, although not always, 
associated with settings where a number of parties hold entitlements that must be assembled, each of 
which is essential to the project as a whole.  For an illuminating discussion of the differences and simi-
larities between holding out and free riding, see Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 351 (1991). 
 50 The Chicken Game, so named for its structural resemblance to drivers playing “chicken” on a 
roadway, has been used to illuminate a variety of bargaining situations.  See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD 
ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 43–45 (1994); WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST 
130–32 (2007).  Because large-number holdout situations can be broken down into a series of two-
player bilateral monopoly situations between a would-be assembler and each would-be seller, the same 
Chicken Game analysis that applies to the latter also applies to the former.  See, e.g., CHARLES J. 
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ments to bargaining are included in some definitions of the term “transac-
tion costs,” but not others.51  Coase’s own phrase, “to conduct negotiations 
leading up to a bargain,”52 could be read to encompass strategic interac-
tions.  Indeed, it might seem implausible that Coase would mention the 
costs of “negotiation” — an activity that, by definition, only occurs when 
there is surplus on the table that must be divided up53 — unless he meant 
to include the costs associated with parties attempting to garner larger 
shares of that surplus for themselves.54  However, Coase later expressed 
doubt that conflicts over surplus division would thwart bargains in a signif-
icant proportion of cases,55 which might support a narrower reading.56 
Demsetz, for his part, contends that strategic behavior — manifested as 
misrepresentation of reservation prices — cannot count as a transaction 
cost.57  Similarly, Robert Cooter asserts that parties to bargaining interac-
tions face “another obstacle of an entirely different kind” from transaction 
costs when they must decide how to divide up the surplus in the absence 
of a fixed price.58  Other scholars, however, have placed some or all stra-
tegic bargaining costs under the heading of transaction costs.  Oliver Wil-
liamson would count strategic behavior among transaction costs.59  Guido 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
GOETZ, LAW AND ECONOMICS: CASES AND MATERIALS 35 (1984) (describing a land assembly 
problem as “chicken in action”); Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 
907, 941–42, 946–47 (2004) (applying the Chicken Game template to anticommons problems). 
 51 See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 8, at 1675–76. 
 52 Coase, supra note 1, at 15. 
 53 Negotiation has no place in competitive markets; market participants instead confront “non-
negotiable equilibrium market prices, prices that cannot be influenced by individual bargaining.”  Dem-
setz, supra note 8, at 12.  If there is any negotiation going on, then, it must be under conditions where 
there is no competitive price and a real question of how to divide gains from trade.  See Cooter, supra 
note 41, at 17. 
 54 But see Demsetz, supra note 8, at 12  (“Close reading of Pigou and Coase does not reveal con-
cerns about strategic misrepresentation.”); Cooter, supra note 41, at 19 (suggesting that Coase viewed 
“strategic considerations” as “inconsequential”). 
 55 See COASE, supra note 44, at 161 (discussing the problem of surplus division and stating that 
“there is good reason to suppose that the proportion of cases in which no agreement is reached will be 
small”). 
 56 Coase might doubt that strategic behavior would often preclude a bargain and nonetheless treat as 
transaction costs the drag that such behavior imposes on bargaining.  However, the costliness of such 
strategies depends on the credible threat of “no bargain,” which cuts against this interpretation.  See 
also Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427, 429–30 (1972) 
(arguing that to include “bargaining tactics” among transaction costs would call into question the com-
patibility of individual rationality and zero transaction costs — at least if one believes that rational ac-
tors may sometimes bargain in ways that fail to reach efficient  
outcomes). 
 57 See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 8, at 11 (“The potential for deceit is not due to positive transaction 
cost.  If everyone who would benefit from improved climate could transact freely (that is, could be 
gathered at no cost, could speak to each other at no cost, could write and enforce contracts at no cost), 
the problem of biased demand revelation would still remain.”). 
 58 Cooter, supra note 41, at 17. 
 59 WILLIAMSON, supra note 18, at 251–52 (observing, in discussing Coase’s work, that “[i]nstead 
of costless bargaining, my negotiations are characterized by information impactedness, opportunism, 
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Calabresi includes among transaction costs the “costs of excluding from 
the benefits the free loaders, that is, those who would gain from a bargain 
but are unwilling to pay to bring it about.”60  The costs associated with 
holding out have also been expressly encompassed in some accounts of 
transaction costs.61  Other scholarship sends mixed signals about whether 
strategic behavior counts as a transaction cost.62 
This definitional issue has attracted interest because removing strategic 
behavior from the realm of transaction costs presents a challenge to the 
Coase Theorem.63  Eliminating transaction costs (defined to exclude such 
behavior) would not be enough to ensure an efficient result outside of 
competitive market conditions.  Or, as Cooter bluntly puts it: “The Coase 
Theorem is false because the final obstacle to private noncompetitive bar-
gains is the absence of a rule for dividing the surplus, not the cost of bar-
gaining.”64  Yet the lack of a rule about surplus is not an immutable fact; it 
stems from a failure to specify rights over that surplus ex ante.65  If that 
lack of specification is itself a product of high transaction costs (the pro-
hibitive cost of obtaining full information and contracting over all contin-
gencies),66 then Cooter’s critique begins to unravel — but so too does our 
grip on the preconditions for transactions. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
and the sacrifice of valuable resources as parties seek strategic advantage and thereafter engage in hag-
gling”). 
 60 Calabresi, supra note 35, at 67.  Interestingly, Cooter seems willing to count the costs of exclud-
ing “freeloaders” as a transaction cost, despite his insistence that strategic behavior in the absence of 
fixed prices represents a wholly distinct phenomenon.  See Cooter, supra note 41, at 16 (citing Calabre-
si, supra note 35).  Demsetz, by contrast, views free riding as a serious impediment to efficiency but 
does not consider it a transaction cost.  DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 116–17. 
 61 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 103 
(1998); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs 
to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 273 (1986). 
 62 For example, Robert Ellickson includes “information costs” in his taxonomy of transaction costs, 
see Ellickson, supra note 42, at 615–16, and then indicates in a footnote that “[s]trategic behavior by a 
bargainer is designed to generate information about a transferor’s reservation price and terms,” id. at 
616 n.25.  Earlier in the same article, however, Ellickson makes an offhand reference to “armchair theo-
rizing about whether strategic behavior, or wealth effects, or nonconvexities, or what-not might under-
mine Coase-Theorem predictions about life in the never-never-world of zero transaction costs” — an 
aside that suggests “strategic behavior” could exist even if transaction costs were zero.  Id. at 613. 
 63 See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 8, at 1675–76. 
 64 Cooter, supra note 41, at 28.  Cooter does posit that a version of the Coase Theorem that speci-
fies not only zero transaction costs but also “perfect competition” and “perfect information” holds true.  
Id. at 15 (quoting Richard O. Zerbe, The Problem of Social Cost: Fifteen Years Later, in THEORY AND 
MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES 29, 29 (Steven A.Y. Lin ed., 1976)). 
 65 This failure to specify surplus division is a general characteristic of private property rights, alt-
hough it can be characterized as a way in which private property rights are incomplete.  See Lee Anne 
Fennell, Property and Precaution, J. TORT L., Sept. 2011, art.3, at 60 n.246, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1862403; infra TAN 161. 
 66 See STEVEN N.S. CHEUNG, WILL CHINA GO ‘CAPITALIST’? 37 (2d ed. 1986) (observing that a 
strong assumption of zero transaction costs implies, among other things, that “consumer preferences 
would be revealed without cost” and that “workers and other factors of production would be directed 
freely to produce in perfect accord with consumer preference”). 
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2.  Defining and Enforcing Property Rights. — Coase’s framework as-
sumes the existence of property rights.67  Demsetz’s work emphasizes that 
property entitlements cost something to define and enforce.68  Should these 
costs count as transaction costs?  At one level, the construction of enforce-
able entitlements seems fully anterior to the transactions with which Coase 
was concerned.  Transactions have entitlements as their subjects, and prop-
erty law merely provides the vehicles in which tradable commodities arrive 
on the scene.  There may be problems designing those vehicles — as 
where indivisibilities enable free-rider problems — but for Demsetz, at 
least, those problems are not transaction costs.69 
However, transaction costs have been understood to include the costs 
of enforcing agreements.  Coase’s initial definition hints in this direction 
by including costs “to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that 
the terms of the contract are being observed,”70 and he later expressly en-
dorses Dahlman’s placement of “policing and enforcement costs” under the 
transaction cost umbrella.71  Property rights might be viewed either as a 
means for policing agreements or as a technology that lowers the cost of 
doing so.72  At a more fundamental level, the work of defining and enforc-
ing property entitlements is one of many costs that society incurs to create 
conditions conducive to enforceable transactions.  Oran Young puts it this 
way: “[M]ajor transaction costs will not show up in prices or be taken into 
account in ordinary efficiency calculations.  These include such things as 
the costs of defining and securing property rights, enforcing contracts, and 
maintaining competition in the face of monopolistic pressures.”73 
Of course, many other things are but-for preconditions of transactions, 
including the development of language, mathematics, and a monetary sys-
tem.  Calling them all transaction costs seems overbroad.  Property rights 
arguably stand in a different relationship to transactions than these large-
scale (and long-sunk) costs because they are legally malleable features of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 1, at 8; Demsetz, supra note 40, at S655.  Coase’s conception of 
property rights has been criticized for being insufficiently “Coasean.”  See generally Thomas W. Merrill 
& Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & ECON. S77 (2011).  Thomas 
Merrill and Henry Smith’s critique focuses on Coase’s assumption that property entitlements can be 
disaggregated and combined without limit.  Because a Coasean conception of interactions among enti-
tlement holders is sensitive to transaction costs, it suggests the need to create property packages that are 
attentive to these costs.  See id. at S92–99. 
 68 See generally Demsetz, supra note 19.  As Terry Anderson and P.J. Hill explain, “Establishing 
and protecting property rights is very much a productive activity toward which resources can be devot-
ed.  But, like any other activity, the amount of this investment will depend upon the marginal benefits 
and costs to investors of allocating resources to these endeavors.”  Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The 
Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 165 (1975). 
 69 See Demsetz, supra note 8, at 11–12. 
 70 Coase, supra note 1, at 15. 
 71 COASE, supra note 44, at 6 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 72 See Allen, supra note 2, at 898–99 (noting connections between property rights and the transac-
tion costs of “inspection, enforcing, policing and measurement,” id. at 899). 
 73 ORAN R. YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES 129 (1982). 
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the world that produce ongoing costs themselves and influence the costli-
ness of transactions going forward.74 
Yet reading transaction costs to subsume the whole of property rights is 
problematic.  For one thing, almost everyone speaks and writes as if trans-
action costs and property rights are separate things — right down to the 
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, which awarded Coase the 1991  
Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 
“for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs 
and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the 
economy.”75  Linguistic habits aside, viewing property as just another fla-
vor of transaction cost is conceptually incoherent, if we think that there 
must be some object of a transaction — a point to which I will return. 
Nonetheless, the inclination to include property rights in the analysis 
surrounding transaction costs is understandable.  Property rights can make 
transactions easier in some ways and harder in other ways.  Their scope 
and complementarity will determine the need for further transactions.76  
Moreover, property’s core move — identifying an “owner” as the residual 
claimant — avoids the high costs of transacting over every contingency.77  
This point connects to bodies of work on incomplete contracting and the 
theory of the firm,78 and it brings us to another area of contested defini-
tional terrain. 
3.  Internal Governance. — Another set of costs relates to property or-
ganization, and specifically to the governance burdens found on the inside 
of the property envelope.  For example, firms may integrate a variety of 
functions as a result of high (interfirm) transaction costs.79  Fred 
McChesney has taken the view that these internal “management costs” 
might be termed a form of transaction costs, while Demsetz has assumed 
the opposite.80  Coase himself discussed organizational changes such as 
vertical or horizontal integration as alternatives to the high costs of market 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 74 Property rights involve both fixed and variable costs.  See Langlois, supra note 14, at 1392–93 & 
fig.1 (identifying both fixed transaction costs and transaction costs that are a function of time as 
“[c]osts of property rights”).   
 75 Press Release, Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences 
in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1991 (Oct. 15, 1991), available at 
www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1991/press.html (emphasis added). 
 76 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 67. 
 77 See, e.g., Grossman & Hart, supra note 18, at 692, 695. 
 78 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 79 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 18, at 390–98. 
 80 See Fred S. McChesney, Coase, Demsetz, and the Unending Externality Debate, 26 CATO J. 179, 
190–91 (2006) (observing that “what Demsetz refers to as ‘management costs’ are just internal transac-
tion costs,” id. at 190, and noting that these costs would be encompassed if transaction costs were “de-
fined as all costs arising from interactions among two or more economic actors,” id. at 191); see also 
DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 107 (“Coase clearly meant to distinguish costs incurred to manage re-
sources within the firm from costs incurred to interact across markets at market-determined prices, and 
I wish to preserve this distinction.”). 
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transactions.81  But this would not rule out applying the more generic mon-
iker of transaction costs to both classes of costs, and their much-remarked 
ability to substitute for each other might argue for placing them under the 
same analytic umbrella.82 
Adding this last category to the definition of transaction costs makes 
the term broad enough to reach the institutional structures in which trans-
actions (or their substitutes) take place, as well as the transactions them-
selves.  Indeed, Steven Cheung has suggested that “[w]ere it not for the 
popular usage of the [transaction cost] term, they should perhaps be called 
‘institution costs.’”83  The “property right” definition of transaction costs 
described by Douglas Allen similarly embraces the costs associated with 
establishing and operating property institutions.84  Such a broad definition 
of transaction costs avoids some problems of underinclusiveness, but it 
does not help to structure the analytic work of designing entitlements or 
determining when legal interventions are called for.  The problems of over-
inclusiveness and lack of specification remain.  Indeed, the broadest defini-
tions of transaction costs address underinclusiveness by opening the door 
to an essentially unbounded class of costs, as the next section explains. 
C.  Latent Transaction Costs 
All of the definitional debates outlined above stem from a single cause: 
the uneasy relationship between property rights and transaction costs.  The 
discussions above hinted that there must be some practical stopping points 
in even the broadest definitions of transaction costs, such as not including 
all of the costs associated with developing language and a currency sys-
tem.  This intuition seems necessary if we want a tractable category.  But a 
hard look at the transaction costs concept shows that it is actually quite 
difficult to bound in this way; in our efforts to address underinclusiveness, 
we end up with an unhelpfully overinclusive category.  
The nature of the problem becomes evident if we consider what the 
expression “zero transaction costs” means.  If the phrase means just that 
there are no observable transactions occurring on the ground that generate 
any costs, then we would be in a zero transaction cost world anytime bar-
gaining was shut down by some external factor like a governmental prohi-
bition on trades, as well as anytime parties became too discouraged by the 
prospects of transacting to even give it a try.  This is not the zero transac-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 81 Coase, supra note 1, at 16. 
 82 See, e.g., Thráinn Eggertsson, Analyzing Institutional Successes and Failures: A Millennium of 
Common Mountain Pastures in Iceland, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 423, 425 (1992) (treating “costs of 
exclusion and internal governance” as transaction costs). 
 83 CHEUNG, supra note 66, at 34. 
 84 See Allen, supra note 2, at 895–99. 
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tion cost world Coase meant to reference.85  Zero transaction costs must, 
therefore, mean not just a literal absence of costs associated with transact-
ing, but rather an ability to costlessly complete transactions. 
By the same token, positive transaction costs exist not only when we 
actually observe them being incurred (“realized transaction costs”), but al-
so when incurring such costs would be necessary to complete a given 
transaction through the market (“latent transaction costs”86) — even 
though the entitlement in question is never transferred or is transferred us-
ing some nonmarket means.  Positive transaction costs are a condition that, 
much like gravity, exists in the background even when arrangements exist 
to counter or eliminate its immediate effects.  Even if a zero-gravity cham-
ber can be created on Earth, every detail of its construction and operation 
is a product of the force it is fighting to overcome.  Likewise, the costs of 
transactions are a latent and shaping presence even in contexts where ob-
servable transaction costs, and even transactions themselves, are absent.87 
A central way in which latent transaction costs manifest themselves in 
absentia is through the formulation of property rights, which avoid the 
need for certain kinds of transactions and lower the costs of others, but al-
so carry costs of their own.  The implications of this point are interesting 
for property scholars.  Suppose a particular configuration of property 
rights, such as liability rule protection that allows for unilateral transfers of 
entitlements, makes transactions unnecessary.  This in no way implies we 
have reached a zero transaction cost world; rather, it is quite consistent 
with a world in which (latent) transaction costs are high, even though the 
liability rule regime keeps anyone from having to experience them.  The 
same might be said about ownership structures that encompass a variety of 
disparate enterprises in order to control transaction costs.  More generally, 
property rule protected entitlements, which substitute a simple in rem re-
gime for private deals with every would-be encroacher, have been cast as 
mechanisms for economizing on transaction costs.88 
At this point, the reader will detect a troubling unraveling effect.  
Coase assumed the existence of property rights, but if property rights are 
really just a manifestation of latent transaction costs, why would they (how 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 85 See CHEUNG, supra note 66, at 34 (explaining that “transaction costs” may, on a broad def-
inition, “occur in the total absence of market transactions or even where property rights are not trans-
ferable”).  But cf. Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 25, at 99 (pairing an assertion that transaction costs can 
be “too low” with an example in which parties are discouraged from undertaking any expenditures on 
transactions). 
 86 The term “latent transaction costs” has been used by scholars previously in a variety of ways.  
David Driesen and Shubha Ghosh use the term “phantom transaction costs” to refer to unincurred 
transaction costs.  See Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 25, at 82–84. 
 87 See CHEUNG, supra note 66, at 34.  I am not advancing a principle of conservation here.  Trans-
action costs (and those costs they occasion) can clearly drop in absolute terms, whether through techno-
logical or legal innovation. 
 88 Chang & Smith, supra note 3, at 31 (arguing that “property is a law of things . . . for transaction 
cost reasons”). 
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could they) even exist in a zero transaction cost world?89  Yet it is hard to 
conceptualize what a “transaction” would mean in a world without any 
property rights — what would there be to transact over?90  Indeed, imagin-
ing the conditions under which no latent transaction costs would be present 
requires stripping away not only property rights, but also all forms of gov-
ernment, transportation, communication, education, monetary systems, 
firms, households, and so on.  The notion of a zero transaction cost world 
quickly becomes a metaphysical sinkhole, lending credence to Coase’s 
suggestion that “[i]t would not seem worthwhile to spend much time inves-
tigating the properties of such a world.”91  So let us step back from the 
abyss and make some observations. 
Positive transaction costs might be understood to produce three effects 
in the real world: (1) the realized costs associated with actual transactions 
that we can observe on the ground; (2) prohibitive, unincurred transaction 
costs that manifest themselves latently in thing-misallocation; and (3) un-
incurred transaction costs that manifest themselves latently in other costly 
resource access structures, such as property entitlements, legal institutions, 
firms, and norms, as well as in behaviors like self-help, stealing, shirking, 
and so on.  When transaction costs are of the latent variety, we observe not 
the cost of the (unconsummated) transaction but rather some other costly 
result that, as a first cut, we might assume to be cheaper than that transac-
tion would have been: Demsetz’s efficiently unshipped shipment.  Perhaps 
the costs of completing the transaction could be cost-effectively reduced 
by incurring further costs of the (3) variety, but perhaps the reverse is true 
and we should have fewer (3) costs and more (1) and (2) costs.  Any ob-
served combination of the three effects may be efficient; the question is 
whether there is any way to reduce any of these costs without increasing 
the others by an offsetting or larger amount. 
The three effects above can unwind the “chicken and egg” nature of 
transaction costs and property rights.  Imagine that the world starts in a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 89 One answer is simply that property rights would be unnecessary in a zero transaction cost world.  
See id. at 31 n.92; see also CHEUNG, supra note 66, at 37 (“[W]e discover that the assumption of pri-
vate property rights can be dropped without in the least negating the Coase Theorem!  That is . . . in 
the absence of transaction costs the allocation of resources would be the same regardless of the nature 
of property rights or regardless of the operative economic institution.”); COASE, supra note 44, at 14–
15 (agreeing with Cheung’s statement). 
 90 See Allen, supra note 2, at 898.  Scholars who maintain that “property” refers to a set of entitle-
ments with certain core institutional features might answer that if transaction costs were zero, individu-
als could transact over bare use privileges and their own labor inputs on a moment-by-moment basis — 
all without ever using the institution of “property” as such.  See Lee & Smith, supra note 3, at 147–48 
(discussing the possibility that “ultra-thin” entitlements might be traded, but for prohibitive transaction 
costs).  Although this approach would allow for transactions without property (simply by narrowly de-
fining the term property), it would not wholly succeed in stopping the unraveling effect noted in the 
text.  Even the barest entitlement, and even the idea of an entitlement, is a mechanism for delivering a 
stream of benefits in a sensible way where transaction costs are not zero. 
 91 COASE, supra note 44, at 15. 
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state of nature dominated by effect (2), where resources are widely misal-
located because transactions are prohibitively expensive.  It will be impos-
sible to move from this world to a world of realized transaction costs 
without first laying some sort of institutional groundwork to enable trans-
actions.  That is, only after we see a certain amount of effect (3) (including 
the formation of property rights) does it become possible for effect (1) (the 
costs of actual, realized transactions) to be observed.  Thus, transaction 
cost expenditures of the latent variety can logically precede property rights 
even if transactions themselves realistically cannot.  Yet because transac-
tion costs also persist even after private property rights and other ways of 
structuring access to resources are in place, it is easy to identify them with 
the costs of market transactions (effect (1)) and lament their contribution 
to thing-misallocation (effect (2)) without revisiting their latent role in the 
institutions and practices surrounding resource access (effect (3)). 
The awkwardness of thinking in terms of latent transaction costs sug-
gests that the transaction cost category suffers from boundary problems 
that run deeper than a list of terminological quibbles.  There is a reason 
why transaction costs are so hard to define: the movement of entitlements 
is entwined with a set of costs relating to property ownership, yet owner-
ship sits uneasily in the transaction cost framework, either relegated to the 
sidelines, partly in and partly out of the game, or swallowed up by it in 
ways that make its relevance unclear.  There is a better way of thinking 
about the relationships among property entitlements, transaction costs, and 
the efficient allocation of resources.  
II.  RESOURCE ACCESS COSTS 
Let us start over from a somewhat different place by considering the 
problem to which legal innovations and interventions must respond.  Peo-
ple derive value from the use of resources.  The total amount of value 
gleaned from the enjoyment and deployment of resources depends on the 
specific ways those resources are accessed — how and when and by whom 
and in what combinations.  Thus, the law must find ways (and has found 
ways) to structure access to resources.  The challenge is to determine 
where resource access improvements can be cost-effectively pursued, 
whether through entitlement redesign or otherwise.  The first step toward 
meeting this challenge is to construct a broad category of resource access 
costs that includes all of the costs associated with structuring access to re-
sources. 
Before turning to the components of this category, it is worth explain-
ing why introducing a new label, resource access costs, is preferable to 
simply redefining the term transaction costs.  One reason is simply to 
avoid confusion associated with a term that already has multiple, contested 
meanings.  More importantly, though, constructing the resource access cost 
category is a way station toward a shift in approach from transaction cost 
minimization to resource access improvements.  While it is possible to 
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speak in terms of transaction cost improvements, doing so is awkward, es-
pecially when some such improvements might involve fewer or more cost-
ly transactions.  The change in terminology is consistent with a change in 
focus.  Our problem is not a lack of transactions, but rather a larger set of 
impediments to optimal patterns of resource access in a world where re-
sources must be consumed to create and maintain those patterns. 
Section A below works through the components of the resource access 
cost category, while section B shows how building this broad and inclusive 
category causes us to ask different questions than does a focus on transac-
tion costs.  Fully answering those questions, however, requires the refine-
ments in Part III that address the remaining problems of overinclusiveness 
and insufficiently specified subcategories. 
A.  Constructing the Category 
The resource access costs category includes the costs of resisting trans-
fers, the costs of completing transfers, and the costs associated with re-
sources ending up in the wrong hands.92  Section 1 starts with this third 
element, the costs associated with thing-misallocation, which can result ei-
ther when a resource stays in the hands of a lower-valuing user, or when a 
resource moves into the hands of a lower-valuing user.  Significantly, shifts 
can occur through mechanisms other than markets — whether through giv-
ing, lending, sharing, stealing, adverse possession, eminent domain, or in-
ternal management decisions.  Likewise, resources may be kept from mov-
ing not only by formal property rights, but also by norms, force, and so on.  
Sections 2 and 3 collectively take on the costs of completing and resisting 
transfers.  Section 2 focuses on individual efforts to complete and resist 
transfers, while section 3 examines institutional arrangements directed at 
completing and resisting transfers. 
1.  Thing-Misallocation. — High-valuing users93 can be separated from 
things in two basic ways: through transfers that occur, and through trans-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 92 Getting resources into the hands of the higher valuer is a question of allocative efficiency.  Ques-
tions of productive efficiency are also in play: we wish to produce transfers and transfer resistance at 
the lowest possible cost, but we should produce them only to the extent that they generate sufficient 
gains in allocative efficiency.  Rather than separate out these types of efficiency and trace their interac-
tion, it is more helpful to apply a Kaldor-Hicks standard to proposed alterations in resource access ar-
rangements to test whether the social losses incurred in making or resisting transfers (or in reducing the 
costs of doing so) are outweighed by gains in access to resources by higher valuers.  In other words, 
could the winners compensate the losers and come out ahead?  My use of the term “efficiency” in the 
balance of the Article is directed toward this question.  
 93 A high-valuing user might be understood as one who possesses human inputs that are comple-
mentary to the resource in question and that, when combined with it, will maximize the value that can 
be derived from that resource.  This could be through simple consumption or through the act of com-
bining multiple resources to which one has access; for example, I am the high valuer of the berry if my 
input of eating the berry or of mixing it into a pie will cause it to produce greater value than it would 
have in some alternative use.  Significantly, the institutional structures that provide access to resources 
also must be designed to elicit the human inputs that will make that access valuable.  See R.H. Coase, 
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fers that do not occur.94  Of course, these are the same two ways that high-
valuing users get (or keep) access to resources.  Table 1 lays out the possi-
bilities. 
TABLE 1: KEEPS AND SHIFTS 
 
 
No Transfer Occurs Transfer Occurs 
Current Possessor Is 
the High Valuer 
A [Good Keep] C [Bad Shift] 
Current Possessor Is 
the Low Valuer 
B  [Bad Keep] D [Good Shift] 
 
In the “No Transfer Occurs” column, we have two situations in which 
the current possessor remains in possession.  In Cell A, this is a good 
thing;95 the high valuer keeps the resource.  Cell B contains the unhappy 
result in which the high valuer does not gain access to the resource.  This 
may be due to strategic or emotional behavior in the bargaining process on 
the part of one or both parties (blocking by the owner or walking away by 
the would-be purchaser).  Or it could instead be the result of parties’ fail-
ure to locate each other and work through the necessary coordinating steps 
to complete the transfer.  Third parties, including governmental actors, 
might also block worthwhile transfers where they control a needed input 
(such as liquidity or a necessary permit).  These blockades, too, could ei-
ther be strategic or the product of failed coordination, or they might (as in 
the case of some governmental impediments) stem from other normative 
commitments.96 
The “Transfer Occurs” column contains completed transfers.  Cell C 
represents transfers that go to a lower valuer, a bad thing.  Such transfers 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 718 (1992) (“It is obviously desira-
ble that these rights should be assigned to those who can use them most productively and with incen-
tives that lead them to do so . . . .”). 
 94 Under some property regimes, these problems become interwoven.  For example, where re-
sources are held in common, commoners can block each other from using resources, or may mis-
appropriate resources that would be more valuable if left in place.  A similar story can be told where 
resources are held not in common but in agency relationships: the agent may misappropriate resources 
of the principal or block the optimal use of the agent’s own human capital, via shirking. 
 95 The terms “good” and “bad” in Table 1 are accurate only insofar as all other costs are held con-
stant.  As emphasized below, the normative desirability of these keeps and shifts depends not only on 
whether they give the high valuer access to the resource in question, but also on how much it costs to 
achieve this result. 
 96 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111–15 (1972) (discussing inalienability rules and 
their rationales). 
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may involve the misappropriation of a resource by a lower valuer or the 
foisting of an asset upon a lower valuer through a value-reducing ex-
change.  Alternatively, a Cell C transfer may happen inadvertently, as 
when a resource is transferred to a lower valuer as a result of mistake on 
the part of one or both parties — a kind of fumble.  Cell D reflects shifts 
to higher valuers. 
It would be tempting, but wrong, to automatically associate Cells A and 
D with efficiency, and Cells B and C with inefficiency.  Whether the trans-
fers or nontransfers reflected in these cells are efficient or inefficient de-
pends not only on whether they get or keep the resource in the hands of a 
high valuer, but also on the resources expended to produce that result.  To 
put it another way, the resource under discussion in the chart (whether a 
chunk of land, a chattel, or a particular use right) is never the only re-
source in the story.  We must also think about the other resources that must 
be expended to complete or stop each transfer.  Thus, we should think of 
Cells A and D as containing goods that we must pay for in some manner.  
Likewise, Cells B and C contain bads that we must pay to avoid.  Framing 
things in this way makes it clear that we as a society can make the mistake 
of purchasing too many Cell A retentions and too many Cell D transfers, 
and that we can also pay too much to avoid Cell B and C outcomes.  The 
costs involved may be institutional in nature or may take the form of self-
help or wrangling of various sorts, as the next section explains. 
2.  Individual Transfer and Transfer Resistance Measures. — Parties 
can engage in a wide variety of defensive and reactive moves in an effort 
to stop transfers or to carry them out.  For example, an owner can protect 
her property by building fences, adding locks, or procuring watchdogs.  A 
would-be invader can invest in ladders, lockpicks, and meaty bribes, spur-
ring counterinvestments in higher fences, better locks, bribe-proof dogs, 
and so on.  Similarly, a commoner might respond to another commoner’s 
conflicting claim on a resource with violence or harsh looks, or might at-
tempt to forestall such conflicting claims by, say, camping out by the berry 
patch with an automatic weapon at hand.  
Defensive and reactive moves may produce suboptimal use of the pri-
mary resource under consideration, if the resource is destroyed or damaged 
in the fray or sits fallow during the dispute.  But such moves also involve 
the suboptimal use of other resources — time and expenditures devoted to 
guarding, fighting, invading, and so on.  Costly defenses and reactions may 
be undertaken not only by high valuers of the target resource, but also by 
low valuers who wish either to fend off thieves or to overcome the fend-
ing-off in order to act as thieves themselves.  These sources of dissipation 
explain why theft is not governed by a liability rule that would enable a 
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higher valuer to simply take and pay.97  The thief may be the higher valuer 
of the thing in question but, by circumventing the law’s “transaction struc-
ture,”98 she triggers wasteful deployments of other resources by the pos-
sessor.  In Table 1’s classification scheme, a move to a higher-valuing thief 
looks like a “good shift,” but it is not normatively desirable (even from an 
efficiency perspective) because of the costs involved in bringing it about.99 
Another reactive move to an actual or threatened appropriation is a 
failure to invest optimally in productive uses of resources.  Although there 
are complex theoretical and empirical questions about exactly what effect 
certain kinds of appropriations may have on investment levels, the poten-
tial skewing of human capital away from projects requiring resource inputs 
represents another resource misallocation, and one that keeps the possessor 
and others from enjoying the would-be products of investment. 
The costs of defending and reacting to defenses can also explain why a 
commons featuring a fixed quantity of a given resource may generate trag-
edy, even though it would seem to present a zero-sum game that implicates 
only matters of distribution.  In fact, there is always a linked resource-
gathering commons that may be subject to tragedy, even if the underlying 
resource is not.100  Likewise, we can extend our understanding of defen-
sive and reactive dissipation to encompass a wide variety of moves that 
may be made within the context of actual and prospective market transac-
tions to gain more surplus from a given transaction.  Strategic holdout 
problems can emerge where monopoly power is present, and free riding 
may crop up when public goods are on offer.101  Even when private and 
relatively fungible goods are involved, consumers may still expend effort 
attempting to wring surplus from small increments of heterogeneity in 
identically priced items, as by picking through the apple bin.102 
3.  Institutional Arrangements for Completing and Resisting Transfers. 
— Although the discussion above abstracted away from institutional detail, 
societal arrangements for resource access can make it easier or harder for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 97 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen & Richard H. McAdams, The Surprisingly Complex Case Against 
Theft, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 367, 371–74 (1997); Fred S. McChesney, Boxed In: Economists and 
Benefits from Crime, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 225, 227–28 (1993); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare 
Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 228–30 (1967). 
 98 See Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: NOMOS 
XXVII 289, 301–03 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985). 
 99 Of course, many thefts are not “good shifts” even in this very limited sense, in that the thieves 
are not the higher valuers of the thing in question.  More generally, the absence of a market test makes 
it impossible to know who is the higher valuer, unless the punishment for theft is calibrated in a way 
that effectively elicits this information. 
 100 See Fennell, supra note 50, at 922–24. 
 101 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 49. 
 102 See YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 103 (2d ed. 1997); Yoram 
Barzel, Transaction Costs: Are They Just Costs?, 141 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 4, 
7–10 (1985).  Yoram Barzel observes that the seller is effectively “placing in the public domain his 
right over the differential between the more valuable units and the price charged.”  Barzel, supra, at 9. 
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parties to complete or resist transfers.  It is intuitive to think of property as 
an institutional arrangement directed at resisting transfers, and markets as 
an institutional arrangement directed at completing transfers.  But of 
course transfers can also occur within the envelope of property ownership; 
for example, internal governance can structure the movement of resources.  
Indeed, transaction cost analysis has examined in great depth when it is 
cheaper to manage resource access outside of markets and within the struc-
ture of a firm.103 
Analysis similar to that which has been applied to the question of firm 
organization can also be applied to more fundamental questions of proper-
ty rights configuration.  How permanent and exclusive should the path-
ways be that link users and resources?  Who gets to sever relationships be-
tween resources and their users, or reroute resources to other users, and 
under what circumstances?  When and how can packages of entitlements 
be split up and transferred separately, or aggregated together and moved as 
a unit?  Considering these questions reveals that the law is involved not 
only in structuring access to resources, but also in structuring control over 
the institutional features that structure access to resources.104  Here it be-
comes helpful to speak functionally about the core institutional elements in 
play. 
Property rights operate to simultaneously grant and deny access to re-
sources by identifying those who will enjoy a privileged relationship to a 
given resource.105  Encoded into these entitlements are rules about how 
one’s relationship with the entitlement may be altered or maintained over 
time. Following the distinction between exclusion and governance,106 we 
can distinguish between institutional elements that do the work of provid-
ing resource access by walling others out, and those that do their work by 
giving individuals access to resources in more fine-grained ways. 
Alienable property rights premised on boundary exclusion represent 
gated walls that keep the uninvited out while allowing insiders continual 
access to the resources within the walls.107  Walls are not the only way to 
manage resource access, however.  For example, a home’s co-owner might 
have a prioritized relationship to a particular part of the house, even if she 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 103 See sources cited supra note 18; see also Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theo-
ry of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387 (1998) (examining how access, in the absence of property rights, 
can produce incentives for investment). 
 104 Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 96, at 1090–93 (observing that a decision must be made 
about not only whom to entitle, but also about how to protect the entitlement). 
 105 See ARNOLD M. FADEN, ECONOMICS OF SPACE AND TIME 215 (1977) (“The entire institution 
of private property may be construed as a system of selective barriers, denying access to all except 
those authorized by the owner of the property or those having special access rights . . . .”). 
 106 See generally Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002). 
 107 FADEN, supra note 105, at 215–16 (using the analogy of walls to discuss property); J.E. Penner, 
The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 744 (1996) (characterizing proper-
ty as a “gate” that, unlike a wall, permits “selective exclusion”). 
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cannot wall out her co-owners.  Likewise, a commoner’s right to draw ber-
ries from a common supply under a complex rotation scheme tethers those 
resources to her conceptually, even though she does not harbor them with-
in a private walled garden.  Property ownership often combines complex 
resource tethering within the walls with blunt exclusion of those outside.108  
Where multiple activities are being undertaken simultaneously on different 
scales, wall placement becomes an interesting and important problem.109 
Strong property rights protection is often conceptually paired with mar-
kets.  It is standard to assume that in a low transaction cost world, property 
and markets are all we need.  But property rights and markets themselves 
help to construct the transaction cost environment in which they will oper-
ate,110 and are themselves costly to construct and maintain.111  Further, 
some resources resist walling, whether because it is infeasible to subdivide 
a given resource system, or because a resource system has external effects 
that cannot be brought fully within the scope of any one owner.  Markets 
may also be ineffective conduits if the parties to a potential transfer fail to 
cooperate with each other, whether by strategically holding out for a better 
deal or attempting to free ride on transfers to others. 
In addition to institutional arrangements for initiating and resisting the 
movement of entitlements, we have institutional mechanisms for aggregat-
ing and disaggregating sets of entitlements.  First, consider aggregation 
mechanisms.  The economic analysis of law has been faulted for paying 
insufficient attention to the design of property rights.112  Getting the right 
elements together in one place (in anyone’s hands) is as much a challenge 
for efficiency as getting particular entitlements into the right party’s hands.  
If property is configured in a way that puts together complementary ele-
ments (like access to the land and the right to farm it), then transactions to 
put these elements together will be unnecessary; instead, the entire useful 
chunk can be transacted over at one time.113  In fact, property law tends to 
group together certain entitlements in ways that may be intentionally re-
sistant to unbundling.  An antifragmentation rationale has been invoked to 
explain a variety of doctrines, including minimum lot sizes and the rule 
against perpetuities.114 
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 108 See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission 
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998) (describing “limited common property” as 
“commons on the inside, property on the outside”). 
 109 See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1332 (“Decisions on where to set land boundaries are fiendishly 
complex because most tracts of land are suited to multiple uses for which scale efficiencies vary.”). 
 110 See generally, e.g., Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 4. 
 111 See Demsetz, supra note 19, at 350 (“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when 
the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.”). 
 112 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Essay, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001). 
 113 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 67, at S89.  
 114 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1173–82 
(1999). 
FENNELL - CLEAN BOOKPROOFS CORRECTED 03/08/13 – 12:57 PM 
2013] THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCE ACCESS 29 
Just as property bundles may be suboptimally thin, they may also be 
suboptimally thick, encompassing elements that would be more valuable if 
held separately.115  Subdividing entitlements can create new property inter-
ests, as where an access easement is carved out of a fee simple estate, or 
rights to pollute are parceled out in particular ways.  If optimal bundles of 
property are contingent on particular social, economic, and technological 
conditions, then bundling and unbundling will be necessary as time goes 
by, however well-calibrated the initial default bundles may have been. 
Another question that property institutions address is when and why 
and how parties’ access to resources ends and begins.  An access change 
might occur voluntarily through gifts, markets, abandonment, or destruc-
tion, or through sharing, loaning, delegating, and so on.  Parties may also 
hold the power to unilaterally sever ties between other people and the re-
sources to which they are attached.  Viewed broadly, much of property law 
can be understood as specifying who holds the power to end relationships 
between people and things, and over whose objections.  Closely related is 
the question of splitting up the surplus associated with changes in resource 
access.  If nobody has the unilateral power to divide the surplus definitive-
ly, each of two (or more) transacting parties holds an effective veto over 
the change in the resource’s ownership, use, or configuration.  Sometimes 
the law will step in and divide surplus itself, or designate who will be enti-
tled to do so within the context of a given deal.  The entire family of lia-
bility rules can be understood as specialized mechanisms for dividing sur-
plus. 
All of these institutional elements grapple, with varying degrees of 
success, with the core problems of unwanted transfers and nontransfers, 
and with the defensive and reactive moves that those problems prompt.  
And they introduce costs of their own, some of which are publicly borne, 
and some of which are privately borne.116  Recognizing that institutional 
features introduce as well as control costs is central to a taxonomic ap-
proach that captures all that is costly about completing and resisting re-
source transfers.117 
B.  A Revised Look at the Costs of Transacting 
The analysis above emphasizes that transactions are only one way of 
facilitating access to resources, and that transactions themselves require re-
sources that might better be devoted to some other purpose.  The sections 
below suggest how attending to this point reframes efforts to reduce trans-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 115 See Fennell, supra note 65, at 13–14 (explaining that property rights often comprise blocks of 
control that are suboptimally extensive). 
 116 For example, governments must incur costs to regulate markets and run police departments and 
courts, and private parties must incur costs to keep track of, change, or terminate ownership interests. 
 117 Cf. CALABRESI, supra note 35, at 26–31 (noting relevance of prevention costs and administrative 
costs as well as accident costs). 
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action costs.118  I retain the transaction cost terminology in this section to 
highlight the lens-widening work that the resource access costs approach 
brings to inquiries about transaction costs.  This analysis prefigures (and 
underscores the need for) the subdivisions that I introduce in Part III, be-
low. 
1.  Transaction Cost Reductions as Products. — Demsetz has usefully 
suggested that we view transactions as products like any other.119  It costs 
something to produce them, and their production should not be undertaken 
unless it generates benefits in excess of those costs.  In other words, the 
resources that might be used to make a transaction might be better em-
ployed making something else, like a widget.  For this reason, the mere 
existence of high transaction costs does not itself bespeak inefficiency, 
much less make out a case for legal intervention.  It should, however, push 
us to ask two further questions: (1) under what conditions can the market 
be expected to undersupply (or oversupply) transactions? and (2) are other 
methods of accomplishing the ends of transactions (getting or keeping re-
sources in the hands of a high-valuing user) being underprovided or over-
provided relative to the cost savings they produce? 
Both questions can be more easily approached by taking Demsetz’s 
point one step further and viewing transaction cost reductions as products 
that the law can purchase, whether by reducing the cost of inputs, increas-
ing the internalized benefits of transactions, or making the need for the 
transaction moot through the use of a substitute.  Whether it is worth pur-
chasing those reductions depends on what they cost and what they do for 
us in terms of improving resource access. 
An initial question is what we mean by transaction cost reductions.  We 
might mean that individual transactions are subsidized so that their private 
cost falls even though their social cost remains unchanged.  Or we might 
instead mean that individual transactions are streamlined in real terms, as 
through a legal rule that removes a procedural requirement, or some form 
of standardization that makes transacting easier.  Or we might mean that 
entire classes of potential transaction costs are sidestepped because trans-
actions are no longer necessary to bring actors together with (or keep them 
together with) the resources for which they are the high valuers.  Each of 
these approaches will have its own sets of costs. 
2.  Subsidizing. — A naïve response to the reality that transaction costs 
can separate high valuers from resources might be to simply subsidize 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 118 My use of the term transaction costs in this section is limited to costs of transacting in the mar-
ketplace.  Some of the more expansive definitions of the term discussed above would be consistent with 
the analysis here, which goes primarily to the problem of underinclusiveness.  But the questions that 
this analysis pushes us to ask can only be successfully answered through further refinements and sub-
categorizations that address the problems of overinclusiveness and insufficient specification that are 
hinted at here. 
 119 DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 109–10. 
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transactions.  Suppose that after misreading Coase, the government decid-
ed to start a “transaction cost counterpunch” initiative in which individuals 
could get their transaction costs rebated from a central fund.  Citizens 
would be invited to turn in records on the time and money spent transact-
ing, in the same way workers turn in receipts to an employer for reim-
bursement.  Even assuming the scheme could be perfectly enforced and all 
efforts at fraud deterred, this would not be a good idea.  Just as reimburs-
ing for transportation costs would lead people to overuse transportation in-
puts to the exclusion of cheaper alternatives, reimbursing for transactions 
would lead to too many, and too costly, transactions.  High valuers might 
be united with “things” more frequently as a result, but the subsidized 
transactions themselves would pull resources away from higher-valued us-
es at an even greater rate, generating net losses.  Getting rid of private, re-
alized transaction costs would be a recipe for inefficiency, not efficiency. 
If an across-the-board transaction subsidy scheme seems suspect, what 
about a more tailored approach that subsidizes certain kinds of transac-
tions?  We might start by asking whether there is any reason to think that 
the transactions in question are being underproduced by the private market.  
This might be the case where transactions generate significant positive ex-
ternalities.120  A subsidy in such a context would be a standard Pigouvian 
move.  A recent example is found in the idea of “agglomeration bonuses” 
offered to owners of adjacent land parcels who agree to retire contiguous 
lands.121  In this case, the sweetener for private agreement is added onto 
an existing subsidy scheme in recognition of the larger public benefits ac-
cruing from contiguous rather than scattered habitat.  Put another way, the 
system returns some assembly surplus to the parties who are relinquishing 
certain rights in their properties.  The same problems that support the buy-
outs in the first place (the inability of the general public to transact easily 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 120 Transactions might also be underproduced if the government is already taxing or otherwise bur-
dening them.  In such an instance, the subsidy might address the artificial suppression of demand and 
restore matters to the pre-burden baseline.  An obvious question is why it would ever be more cost-
effective to counteract the initial burden than to eliminate it.  This might be the case if the burdens on 
the transaction came in the form of incentives for appropriate action within the context of the transac-
tion.  For example, Nuno Garoupa and Chris Sanchirico point out that certain ways of structuring legal 
rules can act as transaction taxes by reducing joint surplus.  See Nuno Garoupa & Chris William 
Sanchirico, Decoupling as Transactions Tax, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 469, 469–72 (2010).  An invariant 
inducement to enter into such a transaction could counter the distortive effects of the incentive scheme 
without undoing the scheme itself.  But see id. at 486–87 (noting problems with this approach). 
 121 See Gregory M. Parkhurst et al., Agglomeration Bonus: An Incentive Mechanism to Reunite 
Fragmented Habitat for Biodiversity Conservation, 41 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 305, 307 (2002); see also 
Todd G. Olson et al., The Habitat Transaction Method: A Proposal for Creating Tradable Credits in 
Endangered Species Habitat, in BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED SPE-
CIES ACT 27, 28–30 (Hank Fischer & Wendy Hudson eds., 1994) (describing and depicting the “habitat 
transaction method,” which adjusts the value assigned to a given “habitat patch” based on its degree of 
contiguity and configuration); Jonathan Remy Nash, Trading Species: A New Direction for Habitat 
Trading Programs, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 20–29 (2007) (discussing and critiquing the habitat 
transaction method and variations on it). 
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with the landowners) also support a change in the subsidy scheme that bet-
ter calibrates the benefits accruing to the public. 
Another place where the external benefits of transactions might play a 
role is in the context of transactions for which a counterparty is not yet 
identifiable.122  As I have discussed elsewhere,123 there may be settings in 
which the law can play a role in matching temporally offset buyers and 
sellers.  Suppose some landowners are willing to cede their rights to grow 
trees or build additions in ways that would block their neighbors’ solar 
panels, but the neighbors with solar panels have not yet arrived (and may 
not do so, in the presence of uncertainty about the potential for blockages).  
The government could play a role in buying up options on the blocking 
rights which could later be conveyed to in-movers.  The apparatus to carry 
out this operation would be costly, but it would in part be covering costs 
that a counterparty would cover were she present to do so. 
In cases like these, a transaction that would operate to internalize ex-
ternalities may be underproduced because not all of the parties benefited 
by the transaction can or will contribute to the costs of completing the 
transaction.  The existence of externalities surrounding transactions does 
not provide definitive guidance, however.  We must ask a further question, 
following Demsetz: whether the transactions necessary to internalize the 
externality in question are themselves subject to private underproduction.  
Underproduction of such internalizing transactions cannot be inferred from 
the mere persistence of an externality, since externalities cost something to 
internalize and may not be worth internalizing in a given instance. 
This point becomes clear when we recognize that private owners may 
choose to leave goods in the commons.  Demsetz gives the example of a 
parking lot adjacent to a shopping area.124  It would be possible to 
propertize the parking spots and charge a fee for their use; indeed, this 
happens all the time in urban areas.  This approach requires fewer parking 
spaces (because people overconsume a zero-priced commodity) and thus 
lower costs to create parking lots.  But it would also mean higher transac-
tion costs because people have to pay each time they park.  As Demsetz 
explains, “[W]hile we have reduced the resources committed to construct-
ing parking spaces, we have increased resources devoted to market ex-
change.  We may end up by allocating more resources to the provision and 
control of parking than had we allowed free parking because of the re-
sources needed to conduct transactions.”125  In short, creating and enforc-
ing short-term property interests in the individual spaces may not be worth 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 122 I thank Ariel Porat for discussions on this point. 
 123 See Fennell, supra note 65, at 24–27. 
 124 Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & ECON. 11, 14–15 
(1964). 
 125 Id. at 14. 
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it.126  In a case like this one, the inputs into the foregone transactions (an 
entry control gate, a gatekeeper, and so on) are readily available through 
competitive markets, and the costs of these inputs could be directly im-
posed on those who would benefit from the arrangement.  Transactions are 
not being produced in this example because it is not efficient to produce 
them.  They are not being inefficiently undersupplied.  The same point 
holds when we move outside the property envelope of a single owner.127 
Even if we feel quite certain that a given kind of transaction is being 
underproduced, a subsidy may not be helpful.  We need to know why it is 
being underproduced.  A subsidy might work quite well to ease interac-
tions between willing buyers and sellers (paying them for the time it takes 
to meet, for instance), but not at all well to address their desire to extract 
disproportionate surplus from a deal.  As Cooter has noted, reducing cer-
tain kinds of transaction costs can actually have a pernicious effect where 
strategic holdout behavior is at issue.128  The cheaper it is to transact, the 
lower the opportunity cost of wrangling over surplus, and hence the more 
of it we are likely to see. 
3.  Streamlining. — If subsidies seem like an often unhelpful approach 
to the problem of high transaction costs, we might turn our attention to 
more broad-based measures and expenditures that make market coordina-
tion less expensive.  Consider government investments in transportation 
and communication infrastructure, the public education system, the legal 
system, and the currency system.  Property rights comprise an especially 
interesting and important category of such transaction cost lowering tech-
nologies.  By creating a tradable commodity — a property entitlement — 
the cost of coordinating over a transaction is diminished.  Within the broad 
category of property rights lie a number of specific “transactability fea-
tures,” from land registries to standardization protocols to antifragmenta-
tion doctrines.  All of these things help reduce coordination costs. 
In each instance, we would want to make sure that the returns to these 
investments are worth the cost — that is, capable of facilitating transac-
tions that will generate more surplus than was expended in the process.  
We do have reason to suspect that the private market would undersupply 
many of the things that globally reduce transaction costs, to the extent 
those things take the form of public goods or goods with large network ef-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 126 Of course, this calculus would have to be rethought if technology, demand, or other factors were 
to change in ways that made metering the parking less costly.  See Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejo-
vich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
1137, 1145 (1972) (observing that parking meters would reduce the costs of transacting over rights to 
individual parking spaces).  
 127 See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Economic Efficiency Versus Public Choice: The Case of Property 
Rights in Road Traffic Management, 49 B.C. L. REV. 673, 703 n.200 (2008) (noting potential difficul-
ties and costs associated with using “tradable roadway access permits”). 
 128 See Cooter, supra note 41, at 28 (“In fact, it is cheaper to engage in strategic behavior when 
communication is inexpensive.”). 
FENNELL - CLEAN BOOKPROOFS CORRECTED 03/08/13 – 12:57 PM 
34 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 126:1 
fects or spillovers.  But streamlining costs something, and the fact that the 
charges are dispersed across the population should, if anything, make us 
more vigilant in comparing what we are getting with what we are giving 
up.129 
Not all streamlining takes the form of advances in infrastructure or in-
stitutions.  It might instead involve simply rolling back the formal re-
quirements associated with transactions.  Coase mentions one example: 
easing the requirements for completing a contract.
130
  For example, land 
transactions would be cheaper to accomplish were it not for the Statute of 
Frauds, which requires certain formalities, including the use of a written 
document.  Likewise, various consumer transactions could be completed 
more quickly if merchants did not have to comply with disclosure re-
quirements, offer “cool down” periods, and so on.131 
Coase rightly questions whether a given change in the contractual rule 
is worth it, when considered across the full run of cases to which it would 
apply.132  These formalities add to the costs of transactions, but are also 
thought to produce benefits.133  Many of these formalities are meant to 
keep consumers from unwittingly engaging in inefficient transactions — 
ones that leave them worse off — or to keep fraudsters from accessing re-
sources outside of voluntary channels of trade.  Against transaction cost 
savings, then, we must weigh the losses from value-reducing trades or 
misappropriations as well as associated forms of defensive, reactive, and 
institutional dissipation.  Put another way, we cannot analyze the effects on 
the costs of transfers without considering the effects on transfer resistance 
costs. 
4.  Sidestepping. — Neither streamlining nor subsidies get rid of mar-
ket transactions; they simply make market mechanisms less expensive for 
willing participants to use.  Such approaches are not designed to deal with 
strategic behavior that can impede bargains.  A great deal of legal attention 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 129 An insight of public choice theory is that scattered impacts may elicit a muted political response 
relative to those concentrated on a small, cohesive group.  See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 12–37 (1991) (discussing the role of interest groups in the politi-
cal process).  As Benito Arruñada has observed in the context of registries, to avoid inefficiency, 
“[R]eformers have to be attentive to signals indicating whether demand really exists for a new institu-
tional development.”  BENITO ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL EX-
CHANGE 7 (2012). 
 130 COASE, supra note 44, at 25–26. 
 131 Merchants may themselves intentionally increase the transaction costs that some or all of their 
potential customers face, whether to screen out some customers, price discriminate among customers, 
or for other reasons.  See generally David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and 
Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and 
Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983 (2006). 
 132 See COASE, supra note 44, at 25–26. 
 133 See id.; see also Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 25, at 87 (“Transaction costs slow down the pro-
cess of transacting and provide a means for parties and the market system to sort out the good transac-
tions from the bad.”). 
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has focused on ways to bypass transactions altogether, primarily through 
liability rules.  Liability rules permit transfers to occur on the unilateral 
initiative of one party upon payment of a stipulated amount to another par-
ty.134  These “substitutes for transactions”135 avoid struggles over surplus 
by setting a price.  But, like every other approach to structuring resource 
access, liability rules have costs of their own. 
One set of concerns has been strongly associated with liability rules in 
the existing literature: the possibility that they will undercompensate, and 
the associated risk that they will transfer resources to low valuers and 
thereby discourage ex ante investments.  These possibilities represent cost-
ly resource misallocations.  But there are other costs associated with liabil-
ity rules, ones that apply even when they achieve their goal of moving re-
sources to a higher valuer.  In addition to the cost of setting up and 
running the liability rule regime, defensive and reactive dissipation may 
occur as parties attempt to protect their property against unilateral, under-
compensated appropriation (or, alternatively, attract overcompensated ap-
propriation) through rent-seeking or otherwise. 
Liability rules are not the only substitutes for transactions.  In addition 
to outright theft, there are a variety of legally approved transfers without 
compensation, such as adverse possession, prescription, and regulations 
that fall short of compensable takings.  Here too we see how avoiding 
transactions introduces other costs (defensive and reactive moves following 
invasion or the threat of invasion).136  To the risk of value-reducing trans-
fers (bad shifts) we must add costs that apply regardless of whether the 
transfer goes to a lower- or higher-valuing user.  An especially interesting 
set of such costs is political in nature and relates to literatures on transition 
relief,137 as well as to Frank Michelman’s notion of “demoralization 
costs.”138 
All of these costs become implicated in entitlement design choices.  
For example, property regimes that grant owners a robust veto power 
across a wide range of dimensions allow owners to choose from an expan-
sive slate of possible activities without having to transact with anyone 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 134 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 96, at 1092, 1105–06. 
 135 Calabresi, supra note 35, at 69.  Liability rules do not produce true transactions because they do 
not involve the voluntary participation of two or more parties, but instead allow one party to override 
the veto power of the other. 
 136 These costs include defensive moves that are the product of errors, or that represent overreac-
tions.  See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 156–57 (Wis. 1997) (homeowners 
refused to allow parties delivering a mobile home to cross their land to avoid dangerous conditions on 
an alternate route, based on an earlier experience of losing land to adverse  
possession). 
 137 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 517–
19 (1986); Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 (2010). 
 138 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
“Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214–18 (1967). 
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first.139  But that same breadth of choice, which constrains the options left 
open to others, may lead to more conflicts than would a more restricted set 
of ownership vetoes.  In the absence of any incentive or mechanism for 
owners to head off future trouble,140 the ensuing clashes may well require 
coercive governmental intervention.  Against the claimed benefits of such 
large and blocky sets of rights, then, we must balance the potentially great-
er need for coercive interventions to address the problems that such rights 
create.  And we must also add the political fallout from that coercion, as 
well as any costs that are incurred to reduce that fallout to acceptable lev-
els. 
There are at least two other ways to sidestep transactions.  One is for 
the law to simply assign resources to their high valuers, through court 
judgments or otherwise.141  The other is to create organizational structures 
that eliminate the need for transactions with outsiders.  Both of these pos-
sibilities have been extensively addressed in the existing transaction cost 
literature.  I will make just two points here to connect these possibilities to 
the resource access costs perspective. 
First, property law plays an often unsung role in assigning resources to 
parties who are likely to be high valuers.  One way it does so is by creat-
ing durable sets of rights that extend forward indefinitely in time and run 
against all outsiders.  Were it not for these features, a possessor could 
maintain possession moment to moment only by constantly paying every-
one else to stay away or by engaging in more costly transaction substitutes, 
like violence or guarding.  We can thus see embedded in the durable struc-
ture of property a rebuttable presumption that possession today is comple-
mentary to possession tomorrow, and that if the current possessor is the 
high valuer today, she is most likely to be the high valuer tomorrow, and 
tomorrow, and tomorrow.142  Following this Article’s analysis, however, 
the durability of property rights should not be taken as a given simply be-
cause it eliminates the need for certain kinds of transactions; its overall 
impact on systems for providing access to resources must be assessed.  
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 139 See generally Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004). 
 140 I have elsewhere offered a proposal along these lines, whereby owners could receive payments 
for alienating options on certain aspects of their property holdings, thus effectively downgrading certain 
aspects of their bundles to liability rule protection.  See Fennell, supra note 65, at 22–52. 
 141 This point connects to the one above about political costs, to the extent that the assignment dis-
rupts expectations about entitlements. 
 142 This presumption relates to property’s trait of “persistence.”  See Henry E. Smith, Property as the 
Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1711–12 (2012).  There are instances where the opposite pre-
sumption of non-persistence applies (think of vacation campsites, public restroom stalls, or seats on a 
thrill ride).  In these cases, it is assumed that value is maximized by rotating possession rather than 
leaving it perpetually with one person — but these are thinner slices of possession than many people 
would identify with property rights. 
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Durability reduces societal flexibility, and it does so in a way that may not 
be appropriately priced.143 
The second point is that choices about organizational structure or, anal-
ogously, the size and scope of property holdings, may not incorporate full 
social costs and benefits.  This is because there is a discontinuity in re-
sponsibility that occurs at the property line, with governance inside largely 
falling on private parties and governance outside largely falling on public 
entities.  Parties can sidestep transactions by expanding their holdings, but 
doing so means giving up some in-kind subsidies, especially with respect 
to transfer resistance.  The result may be unwitting legal encouragement of 
particular organizational forms or spatial configurations, at least in the ab-
sence of countermeasures.  This point has received much less attention 
from legal scholars than has the potential for the fragmentation of entitle-
ments to impede later reaggregation.144 
III.  TOWARD RESOURCE ACCESS IMPROVEMENTS 
The umbrella category of “resource access costs” offers a starting point 
for a new analytic approach.  It addresses the problem of under-
inclusiveness associated with transaction costs by taking into account all of 
the costs of transferring resources and of keeping them where they are, as 
well as the losses that are sustained when either set of costs becomes too 
large to bear.  It also provides a new perspective on where transaction 
costs, and transaction cost reductions, fit into the overall mission of im-
proving access to resources. 
Constructing this category is only a first step, however.  On its own, 
the category is too all-encompassing to helpfully inform entitlement design 
or decisions about legal interventions.  For the same reason, it is not suffi-
cient to simply expand the definition of transaction costs to encompass 
every element that grants, withholds, or regulates access to resources.  
Recognizing that all ways of structuring access to resources implicate costs 
is necessary to avoid an unduly narrow focus, but applying a cost-
minimization function to all of civil society is not a tractable task.145  Le-
gal scholars interested in entitlement design enter the property story in me-
dias res, confronted with institutional structures designed to solve resource 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 143 See, e.g., T. Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization of Spa-
tial Externalities, 66 LAND ECON. 341, 347 (1990) (observing that landowners withdraw flexibility 
from a social fund, and proposing a tax on the right to remain as a possible solution). 
 144 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). 
 145 This analysis highlights a baseline issue that lurks in transaction cost analysis.  The Coasean 
baseline is, implicitly, a “perfect” resource allocation in which all things are held by their highest valu-
ers.  Transaction costs disrupt this pristine world.  Broadening our focus to all resource access costs 
does not on its own alter this baseline, though it does make clearer its artificiality: we now must con-
ceptualize a baseline world in which no property or other institutional elements exist, but in which all 
resources are nonetheless held by their highest valuers. 
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access problems and a stack of unresolved impediments to optimal re-
source allocation.146  It is necessary to identify with precision the resource 
access improvements that particular changes or interventions can buy us, 
and trace the costs of these moves, including their impacts on already-
addressed collective action problems. 
This Part makes a start on that project.  Doing so requires addressing 
two remaining problems in constructing a useful set of concepts for ad-
dressing resource access problems: overinclusiveness and insufficiently 
specified subcategories.  Section A focuses on the second problem by 
drawing a distinction crucial to entitlement design: the degree to which the 
resource access costs in question stem from efforts to wrest something (in-
cluding surplus) from another party, rather than efforts to coordinate with 
another party in the transfer or nontransfer of an entitlement.147  Section B 
addresses overinclusiveness by differentiating costs that are the product of 
market forces and broad-based societal institutions from those that are the 
product of unsolved collective action problems.  This distinction helps iso-
late resource access costs that are relevant to overall efficiency — the only 
resource access costs for which targeted legal interventions may be appro-
priate.148 
A.  Conflict and Coordination Costs 
As the earlier discussion emphasized, the owner (or current possessor) 
of a resource may or may not be the high valuer.  When a nonowner 
comes along, the two parties may or may not agree with each other on 
whether a transfer should occur, or they may agree on the fact of the trans-
fer but disagree on the price.  In competitive markets where prices are 
nonnegotiable, it is entirely possible for both parties to be in full agree-
ment on transacting at a given price; their only problem lies in coordinat-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 146 The point at which entitlement designers enter the story depends on prevailing social and legal 
conditions.  In some instances, broad-based measures to solve large societal problems must precede the 
sort of fine-grained tinkering that might be contemplated in relatively affluent societies with well-
developed property rights, education systems, and so on.  I thank Deborah Weiss for comments on this 
point.  Scholars have explored related points.  See, e.g., ARRUÑADA, supra note 129, at 118–22 (dis-
cussing, in the context of registries, how reforms interact with existing legal orders and how they might 
be sequenced); Langlois, supra note 14, at 1400–05 (examining how institutional and technological 
change over time alters the mix of transaction costs and the prospects for addressing them). 
 147 The distinction between conflict and coordination can be seen in game-theoretic formulations.  
See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and 
Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 230–35 (2009) (emphasizing the significance of coordination games in 
modeling legal problems); see also Robert Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 43, 62–65 (2011) (observing how conflict enters into coordination games).  
 148 The idea that resource access costs may be either relevant or irrelevant to efficiency follows from 
the distinction drawn between Pareto-relevant and -irrelevant externalities in James M. Buchanan & 
Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 371, 373–81 (1962).  See also Dahlman, 
supra note 28, at 145, 150, 152–53 (discussing the idea that transaction costs do not generate Pareto-
relevant externalities); section III.B.2, infra TAN 169–178 (examining how the relevance of resource 
access costs to efficiency might be assessed). 
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ing the transaction.  In many other cases, the absence of established prices 
means that parties who both desire a transfer (or nontransfer) may nonethe-
less disagree about how the surplus from that event should be divided. 
Thus, sometimes interactions over resources involve only coordination, 
sometimes they involve only conflict, and in most cases of interest to legal 
scholars they involve both.  Entitlement design must, therefore, grapple 
with both types of resource access costs.  Carol Rose made just this point 
in distinguishing Type I and Type II transaction costs, where the former 
represent what I here call coordination costs, and the latter represent con-
flict costs.149  I extend her typology to include not only the costs involved 
in moving entitlements, but also the costs of keeping them in place.  Fig-
ure 1 lays out the possibilities. 
FIGURE 1: CONFLICT AND COORDINATION 
 
 
 
The lettered lines in Figure 1 represent six possible combinations of inter-
actions between nonowners and owners over resources.  Line A represents 
the desired (by both parties) transfer of a good at a competitive market 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 149 See Rose, supra note 14, at 2184–88; see also Langlois, supra note 14, at 1390 (drawing a paral-
lel distinction between “transaction costs as frictions” and the problems that arise from opportunism). 
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price.  This price preassigns surplus to the consumer, as indicated by the 
black circle, and therefore involves no haggling, only coordination.  Line 
B obtains when there is no competitively determined market price but both 
parties desire a transfer.  The situation mixes together conflict and coordi-
nation — coordination over the fact of the transfer, but conflict over the 
division of the surplus.  Line C involves an owner who wishes to force a 
transfer upon an unwilling nonowner, while Line D involves a nonowner 
who wishes to force a transfer to herself from an unwilling owner; both 
situations involve conflict. 
Sometimes owners and nonowners agree that no transfer should take 
place.  Line E presents the common situation in which neither party desires 
a transfer and both parties converge on the convention that this nonevent 
should happen in a way that leaves all surplus with the owner.  Here, they 
need only coordinate.  For example, most people who park their cars in a 
parking lot or put their coats in a cloakroom hope to leave with (and only 
with) the item they already own.  Line F represents the situation in which 
both parties desire a nontransfer but conflict over how to divide the surplus 
from this nonevent.  Nonowners’ attempts to extract surplus for a nontrans-
fer (by, say, taking a person or chattel hostage and demanding a ransom) 
tend to be criminally punished, and hence situations of the Line F type are 
highly unusual.  Where they occur, however, both conflict (over surplus 
division) and coordination (over how to accomplish the nontransfer) may 
be involved.150 
Much of the confusion surrounding transaction costs goes to whether 
the term refers just to the costs of using markets to facilitate trade between 
willing buyers and sellers at set prices — that is, the coordination costs in-
curred by parties whose interactions track Line A.  As Figure 1 suggests, 
this is only one possible type of interaction, and it does not describe many 
of the contexts that are most interesting to legal scholars. 
In contexts where set prices are not found and the parties must decide 
on their own how to divide the surplus (Line B in Figure 1), both conflict 
and coordination costs are usually strongly implicated.  For example, if I 
want to buy a car from you,151 we must find each other, decide when and 
where to meet, incur the costs of getting there, and bear the costs of the 
necessary paperwork to complete the transaction (I must write a check, 
you must sign over the title).  These are all coordination costs.  Before the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 150 Note that this situation is quite different from one in which a party already owns a particular right 
(such as to make noise, locate a stable, or exclude a crane from the airspace) and attempts to obtain a 
large amount of surplus from its transfer; this scenario fits easily into situation B in Figure 1.  See gen-
erally Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisprudential Principle of Abuse of Property Right, YALE 
L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1417955; Kelly, supra note 48. 
 151 Cooter also uses a car-buying example to distinguish what he terms “transaction costs” from stra-
tegic behavior.  See Cooter, supra note 41, at 17. 
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transfer can take place, I must also gather quite a bit of information about 
the car and the price you are willing to accept.  Otherwise, I cannot be cer-
tain that the trade is advantageous to me.  Likewise, in order to be sure 
that the trade will be advantageous to you, you must gather information 
from me about the price I am willing to pay. 
This information gathering still involves coordination between us be-
cause of our common interest in completing a worthwhile deal, but the 
specter of conflict is beginning to loom.  The deal, if it is worth doing, will 
produce at least some surplus.  That fact raises the question of how the 
surplus will be divided, and here our interests conflict.152  We may strate-
gically misrepresent our reservation prices in an effort to gain more of the 
available surplus.  If your car is unique and my desire for it is unquencha-
ble, and if I am the only buyer within range and your need for cash is 
pressing, we may find ourselves locked in a bilateral monopoly situation.  
We incur conflict costs as we wrangle over how low or high each of us 
will go. 
There are other conflict costs in this story as well.  I will worry that 
you are misrepresenting some of the attributes of the car in an effort either 
to gain more of the surplus or to generate a transfer in your own favor un-
der circumstances that will leave me worse off.  Whether or not you are 
actually engaging in misrepresentations or covering over the car’s defects, 
I will likely incur defensive costs in trying to verify its attributes, as by 
running a Carfax check on it, or taking it to a mechanic of my own before 
buying it.  You may react to my defensive moves by expending greater re-
sources to fool me (and Carfax, and my mechanic).  Conversely, you will 
worry that when I take the car for a test drive I will simply make off with 
it.  You will incur defensive costs in trying to determine if I am a good 
type before handing over the keys.  You might require me to show you my 
driver’s license and perhaps hand over the keys to my own car as a “hos-
tage.”  If I am in fact bent on making off with the car, I might incur costs 
to thwart your defensive moves, causing you to be even more cautious. 
A close look at how conflict can infect the transaction process reveals 
that even some of the costs that were earlier identified as “coordination 
costs” occur in the shadow of conflict and are shaped by the potential for 
conflict.153  For example, we may incur extra costs (in waiting or transpor-
tation) to meet in broad daylight in a public place rather than in the nearest 
dark alleyway at night — and these costs would be unnecessary if we fully 
trusted each other.  Similarly, you might demand a cashier’s check from 
me rather than a personal check if you are not sure I am good for the pur-
chase price, causing me to make an extra trip to the bank.  More funda-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 152 See id. 
 153 To put the point a little differently, conflict costs must be controlled in certain ways before the 
prospect of cooperation even becomes possible.  Thus, the property rights literature emphasizes the role 
of secure rights in facilitating trade. 
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mentally, the signing over of title is necessary only in a world where dis-
putes might arise over who is to be granted access to the resource. 
A similar blending of coordination costs and conflict costs can be 
found in many other situations.  Consider the familiar polluting factory 
that creates misery for nearby residents far in excess of the value that the 
factory creates.  When high transaction costs are cited as a reason why an 
inefficient outcome could persist, legal scholars mean more than just that it 
is logistically difficult for the residents to communicate with each other 
and coordinate a buyout, although they do mean that.  The transaction can-
not occur without resolving conflicts that arise among the residents over 
who should contribute and in what amounts (free-rider problems) and con-
flicts between the factory and the residents as a whole over the division of 
surplus. 
Despite the fact that conflict costs and coordination costs are often 
blended, it is useful to distinguish them conceptually.  In some settings, ei-
ther conflict or coordination costs dominate while the other category of 
costs is absent or trivial.  Notably, conflict costs do not produce much dif-
ficulty when a transaction is conducted in a competitive market backed by 
strong protections against force and fraud.  Haggling is entirely absent be-
cause the surplus division is fixed in advance; the price is set at marginal 
cost.  Transactions are costly (at the margin) in this context only if the cost 
of coordinating is high relative to the available surplus.  Very often this is 
the case.  For example, I buy fewer pairs of shoes than I would if transact-
ing over them were costless.  The shoe market is highly competitive, and I 
have no fear of shoe fraudsters.  It is just a hassle to bother with shopping 
for them.  I am not acting inefficiently when I forgo a purchase that I 
would have made were it costless.154  This is Demsetz’s point. 
In other contexts, conflict costs dominate and coordination costs are 
trivial.  For example, suppose I plan to build a high privacy fence and my 
next-door neighbor would rather I did not.  Assume the law is clear on my 
right to build, but my neighbor will lose more than I will gain if I go 
through with it.  In theory, he could pay me some amount not to build.  We 
would have no trouble finding each other, communicating with each other, 
or traveling to transact with each other; we already live next door, and no 
third parties (let us assume) are affected.  If we cannot come to terms, it is 
because one or both of us wants more surplus (pecuniary or nonpecuniary) 
from the transaction than the other is willing to cede. 
Conflict costs and coordination costs also come into play in various 
mixtures where resource access is structured without the use of market 
transactions.  Conflict costs, including defensive and reactive behavior, are 
incurred whenever parties resort to force or fraud to allocate resources to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 154 Here, I set aside the (likely) possibility that my failure to do more shoe shopping inflicts harm on 
others. 
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themselves outside of approved channels.  Similarly, conflict costs are in-
curred when parties shirk or overappropriate in a commons, or react to 
such actions in kind or through other defensive or reactive moves.  Organ-
izational structures that give a single owner authority over a range of uses 
and decisions may avoid the need for transactions, but will typically also 
produce conflict costs when agents try for larger shares of surplus and 
principals respond to those attempts.  Coordination costs will be incurred 
in many of these nonmarket settings as well.  Even the most faithful agent 
must be directed, and this takes time and effort.  Likewise, even common-
ers who have no thought of taking advantage of each other must spend 
time and energy devising a workable system for sharing access to re-
sources. 
Finally, coordination costs dominate in most cases when both parties 
desire a nontransfer, as shown in Line E.  This is a ubiquitous state of af-
fairs.  Most people, most of the time, have no desire to take resources from 
each other by encroaching on property rights.  Yet, as Henry Smith and 
Thomas Merrill argue, steering clear of property violations (inadvertent 
transfers) requires that both owners and nonowners use information.155  
The way in which property rights are configured and protected will affect 
the content and legibility of that information, and hence will impact the 
costs of coordination that the parties incur in avoiding unwanted trans-
fers.156 
Property design choices can be used to influence both conflict and co-
ordination costs.  However, features that have a salutary effect on some 
subset of these costs may have either no impact or a countervailing impact 
on other costs.  The question that entitlement designers must confront is 
whether a given feature saves more in net conflict or coordination costs, 
and in the associated improvements in resource access, than it costs.  Table 
2 presents again the situations we saw in Figure 1, along with the design 
features that would be conducive to overcoming the conflict and coordina-
tion costs they present. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 155 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 26 (2000). 
 156 Merrill and Smith make this point when discussing the role of the numerus clausus in controlling 
information costs.  See id. at 26–28; see also Peter J. Menell and Michael S. Meurer, Notice Failure 
and Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1973171 (discussing the need for effective notice in both tangible and intangi-
ble property contexts to enable parties to avoid infringing others’ rights). 
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TABLE 2: CONFLICT, COORDINATION,  
AND DESIGN FEATURES 
Line 
from 
Fig. 1 
Owner 
Wants 
Transfer? 
Nonowner 
Wants Trans-
fer? 
Role for 
Surplus 
Division? 
Conflict or Co-
ordination? 
Design  
Features 
A Yes  Yes No  Coordination Transactability 
B  Yes Yes Yes Both Surplus-
Dividing 
C Yes No N/A Conflict Veto Power 
D No Yes N/A Conflict Veto Power 
E No No No Coordination Legibility 
F No No Yes Both Veto Power 
 
Much of the disagreement about entitlement design comes down to a 
debate between those who focus on Line A, where transactability features 
are key, and those who focus on Line B, where surplus-dividing features 
play a primary role.157  Each group claims to be talking about reducing 
transaction costs, but they are talking about different things — different 
facets of the overall enterprise of minimizing resource access costs.  While 
scholars concerned with coordination costs have emphasized the im-
portance of transactability features, scholars concerned with conflict costs 
have emphasized mechanisms (notably liability rules) that control struggles 
over surplus.  Recognizing that these two very different strategies address 
different sets of problems is an important prerequisite to examining the 
tradeoffs involved in designing property rights.158 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 157 It is true that the coordination element in Line B could also make transactability features relevant, 
but there are two complications that make this proposition uncertain.  First, surplus-dividing features 
often take the form of transaction substitutes, like liability rules, that render some or all of the trans-
actability features moot.  Second, easier transactability may actually exacerbate the problems associated 
with strategic behavior.  See Cooter, supra note 41, at 28.  Thus, it is not clear that a well-defined and 
highly transactable property package will actually produce more efficient results than a more cumber-
some one, where the real impediment is strategic behavior. 
 158 See Rose, supra note 14, at 2184–88. 
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As Table 2 illustrates and as this Article emphasizes, we must be con-
cerned not only with market transactions but also with other sorts of trans-
fers and with efforts to keep transfers from occurring.  The counterpart of 
transactablity for parties who are both trying not to engage in a transfer is 
rendered here as legibility.  Thus, clearly marked boundary lines and clear 
systems of titling would help owners and nonowners to coordinate in ways 
that avoid unwanted (by both parties) transfers from the former to the lat-
ter.  The ability of an owner to resist a transfer to a nonowner who desires 
one, and the ability of a nonowner to resist a transfer from an owner who 
wants one, can both be addressed by giving parties veto rights.  These veto 
rights, in turn, contribute to the strategic interactions in Line B when both 
parties desire a transaction but disagree on the surplus division. 
Some standard features of property entitlements, such as well-defined 
exclusionary edges, can advance more than one goal at once.  Transactabil-
ity features may double as aids to legibility by making it easier for other 
parties to steer clear.  The genius of property lies in precisely this double-
sided accomplishment: stopping resource movement while at the same 
time facilitating it.  State-enforced exclusion rights not only facilitate coor-
dination over nontransfers, but they also address conflicts that take the 
form of misappropriation.  However, not all of the familiar characteristics 
of property entitlements reduce all of the costs in Table 2.  Significantly, 
transactability features are not designed to, and generally do not, ease 
fights over surplus.  They might even make things worse.159  By the same 
token, some legal interventions are designed to address conflict costs (lia-
bility rules, which cut through fights over surplus, are a good example) but 
do not reduce coordination costs and might increase them.160 
This analysis shows that private property arrangements solve certain 
kinds of resource access problems very well.  Transactability and legibility 
facilitate voluntary transfers and nontransfers, respectively, where coordi-
nation is the relevant obstacle.  Private property rights also handle certain 
kinds of conflict well, by giving owners and nonowners alike a veto over 
transfers that are not mutually desired.  But these property entitlements 
embed another source of conflict by leaving unassigned the division of 
surplus upon transfer.  This embedded incompleteness follows from the 
choice to make the owner the residual claimant, a position granted to the 
party whose inputs are the hardest to measure and who must be indirectly 
incentivized to invest optimally.161  Here, the incentive takes the form of 
property rule protection, which grants the owner the right to collect the re-
turns that the property generates unless and until she gets a price she likes. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 159 See Cooter, supra note 41, at 28. 
 160 See Rose, supra note 14, at 2187–88. 
 161 See Smith, supra note 139, at 1795–97; see also BARZEL, supra note 102, at 78–80 (discussing 
property holders as residual claimants). 
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The relevance of investment incentives flows in turn from the owner’s 
right to control other inputs, including her own human capital.  Property 
offers a mechanism for inducing individuals to shift these inputs to socially 
valuable uses.  In a world of zero transaction costs, appropriate contracts 
could be written to provide for all imaginable contingencies.  There would 
be no need to grant anyone a residual claim over anything because rewards 
for desired investments could be set using the information that would be 
costlessly available in such a world.162  Property rights would disappear, 
along with the problem of dividing surplus.  Here we see again how prop-
erty can be understood as both a response to and a cause of positive trans-
action costs. 
It is significant that some institutional responses, both past and poten-
tial, have the power to alter the mix of situations falling within each of the 
six alternatives outlined above.  For example, prior to the development of 
any property rights or any rule of law, we would expect to see more con-
flict over whether a transfer would occur, and perhaps even more attempts 
to extract surplus from allowing possession to continue.  Property rights 
and the development of markets make possible Line A, where coordination 
becomes the central preoccupation, but also contribute to the development 
of Line B, where surplus division presents conflict.  It is not impossible to 
imagine further institutional developments that would help to pre-divide 
surplus in cases that now present conflict. 
For example, suppose a group of 100 people currently find themselves 
locked in a free-rider dilemma that keeps them from being able to buy out 
a polluter whose benefits from continuing in operation are less than their 
collective costs.  They face problems of coordination, but also problems of 
conflict: each person hopes to gain additional surplus from the buyout by 
not contributing to it.  Yet the conflict may be driven in very significant 
part by the fear of being taken advantage of by others (that is, being 
“suckered”) rather than by a desire to take advantage of others.  If every-
one in the group would be happy to contribute if others paid their fair 
share, a mechanism might be designed to enforce equal contributions in a 
manner that would help to turn the conflict problem into one of coordina-
tion. 
Setting up such a mechanism is not costless.  But all property arrange-
ments involve costs.  We must examine what various design features buy 
us (in, say, transactability and the unblocking of human capital) and what 
we have to give up (in the potential blocking of resources that follows 
from leaving surplus from future transfers unassigned).  Matching design 
features to resource access impediments offers a clearer way of making 
these sorts of tradeoffs.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 162 See CHEUNG, supra note 66, at 37. 
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B.  Resource Access Costs and Collective Action Problems 
Another way of subdividing the umbrella category of resource access 
costs is to distinguish costs that represent unsolved collective action prob-
lems from those that do not.  This distinction addresses the overinclusive-
ness built into the concept of transaction costs by asking whether costs 
hide untapped surplus that the law can unlock.  Legal scholars (including 
myself) often reflexively equate thing-misallocation with uncaptured sur-
plus.  After all, the resource could be used more efficiently by someone 
else.  But there is no surplus available to be captured if fixing the misallo-
cation will cost more than it is worth.  Such surplus exists only if the im-
pediments to the thing’s efficient allocation embed inefficiencies them-
selves — ones that the law is in a good position to (further) address.  This 
will not always be the case. 
Legal scholars have skipped over this point for two reasons.  First, 
there is a tendency to focus on the costs of thing-misallocation and to ig-
nore the costs that are saved by leaving those misallocations alone.  Sec-
ond, there is really no doubt that transaction cost reductions (and reduc-
tions in other transfer and transfer avoidance costs) would be 
underproduced by markets and private actors working alone, so that at 
least some legal interventions are plainly warranted.  Yet we should not 
lose sight of the fact that transaction cost reductions are products like any 
other, ones that can become too expensive for society to  
purchase. 
1.  Identifying Unsolved Dilemmas. — Inputs into transfers or transfer 
resistance may be underproduced by the market if the parties who would 
benefit cannot coordinate among themselves.  Institutional responses, in-
cluding property itself, address such collective action problems.163  The 
question for legal scholars is whether there are any unaddressed collective 
action problems that artificially elevate the cost of, or the need for, these 
inputs.  Consider the following factors: the length of time it takes a human 
being to read a paragraph of text, the cost (in time and gasoline and auto-
mobile wear and tear) to travel to a meeting, the cost of printing out a con-
tract, the ease with which a phone call can be made, the cost to repair a 
nose broken in a trespass dispute, the expense of fencing in livestock.164  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 163 A rich literature addresses how property rights emerge, develop, and change over time.  See gen-
erally, e.g., GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 4–28 (1989); Demsetz, supra 
note 19; Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421 
(2002); James E. Krier, Essay, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 139 (2009).  A central puzzle is how parties faced with a tragedy of the commons can solve the 
second-order collective action problem of coordinating to create property rights to address this tragedy.  
See, e.g., James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325 
(1992); Carol M. Rose, Evolution of Property Rights, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 93, 94–95 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 164 See, e.g., Anderson & Hill, supra note 68, at 172 (noting that the development of barbed wire in 
the 1870s “greatly reduced the cost of activities aimed at enclosing one’s land”). 
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In important ways, these quotidian costs are no different in kind from the 
costs of producing other goods and services, or of carrying out other ac-
tivities.  By and large, they are produced by ordinary market processes and 
background physiological, social, and economic conditions. 
This is not to say that these costs are immutable or that law has no 
bearing on them.  Certainly, there are many things that law and social poli-
cy can do at a high level of generality to influence such costs.  Govern-
mental bodies provide transportation infrastructure and public education, 
and they determine city layouts and speed limits.165  The law broadly sup-
ports private innovation, which can lead to such transaction-relevant inno-
vations as better mobile phones, faster laser printers, improved surgical 
techniques, or better fencing.  Competition policy and general laws that 
govern the manufacture and sale of products further contribute to the 
background conditions that produce these costs. 
Yet these legal and policy influences primarily represent existing solu-
tions to collective action problems that operate at a broad level of generali-
ty.  Those solutions may be quite imperfect, and it is entirely fitting that 
legal (and other) scholars should revisit them.  But because of the level of 
generality at which these solutions operate, further alterations would at 
least presumptively apply broadly as well, rather than be uniquely targeted 
at completing or resisting transfers. 
For example, the law would be concerned about distortions in the paper 
market caused by paper mill pollution regardless of whether the paper in 
question is used to write a contract, make a paper airplane, or draft a nov-
el.  Likewise, innovation policy broadly supports mobile phone advances, 
whether a phone is used to call a sick friend or to close a major deal.  Pub-
lic education is valued not only because it lets people transact more easily, 
but also because it makes people better voters and citizens, and prepares 
them to work in a wide variety of jobs — including jobs producing goods 
and services other than transactions.  There is no reason to expect a trans-
fer-specific legal intervention to improve matters, absent some additional, 
unsolved collective action problem that uniquely plagues transfers or trans-
fer resistance. 
Yet even if the inherent costliness of factors like phone calls or fencing 
is determined by a combination of market forces and broad-based features 
of the legal and social context, their prevalence in ordering resource access 
can be directly affected by transaction-specific legal rules and entitlement 
design features.  For example, the law’s requirements for titling and bills 
of sale might shorten or lengthen the time the parties must meet or alter 
the amount of text that has to be read or written to finish a trade. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 165 For a discussion of the economics of infrastructure provision and maintenance, see generally 
Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 917 (2005). 
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Even more significantly, legal rules and assignment protocols influence 
the need to engage in transactions in the first place, which determines 
whether these categories of costs will be incurred at all.  Thus, in rem 
rights avoid many separate transactions with nonowners (saving countless 
pieces of paper, phone calls, and so on).  Other features, like standardized 
property forms or property registries, may reduce the need to gather infor-
mation.166  Analogous points might be made about transfer resistance.  
Some design features, such as strong exclusion rights, stand in for self-help 
and may, for instance, allow owners to get by with clear property markers 
rather than unscalable walls.  Similarly, certain organizational forms that 
the law might encourage or discourage can reduce the total amount of 
transfer resistance necessary within a particular realm.167 
In all these instances and many more, we should be on the lookout for 
some kind of collective action problem that stands unsolved and that law 
would be in a position to address (or to address better, if the existing law 
produces suboptimal results).  A variety of such problems may exist.  Par-
ties may have difficulty coordinating if property rights are ill-defined or 
insufficiently standardized.168  Collective action problems in the political 
process may produce suboptimal transfer requirements — as well as 
suboptimal transfers.  Outdated entitlement menus may stick in place be-
cause there is no market incentive for anyone to take the lead in altering 
them.  Perhaps most significantly, parties may have trouble reaching 
agreement due to holdout or free-rider problems. 
2.  Assessing Inputs. — Asking whether particular resource access costs 
stem (in whole or in part) from unsolved collective action problems is a 
proxy for a deeper set of questions about the relevance of those costs to 
efficiency.  I use the word “relevance” here to consciously invoke the con-
cept of irrelevant externalities introduced in an important article by James 
Buchanan and William Stubblebine.169  Externalities are irrelevant to effi-
ciency if internalizing them would not change behavior, but rather would 
only alter distribution.  For example, a polluting factory may reap benefits 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 166 See, e.g., ARRUÑADA, supra note 129, at 43–75 (discussing the role of titling and registration 
systems in facilitating transactions); Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and 
the Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 309 (1984) (comparing “possession systems” and 
“filing systems” for property from an information perspective). 
 167 The point here is similar to the geometric one often made about fencing.  Bringing holdings un-
der common ownership expands the domain in which transfer resistance is unnecessary, but not without 
increasing internal management burdens.  See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 1332–33. 
 168 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 155, at 27. 
 169 Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 148, at 380–81 (distinguishing Pareto-relevant externalities 
from externalities generated in situations in which “[t]he internal benefits from carrying out the activity, 
net of costs, may be greater than the external damage that is imposed on other parties,” id. at 381); see 
also, e.g., David D. Haddock, Irrelevant Externality Angst, 19 J. INTERDISC. ECON. 3 (2007). 
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that are so great that it would continue to emit at the same level even if it 
had to cover the costs it imposed on its neighbors.170 
We can draw a similar distinction among resource access costs based 
on their relevance or irrelevance to the production of efficient overall out-
comes.171  Recognizing this distinction requires examining the inputs into 
completing or stopping resource transfers.  Costs associated with inputs 
that are available through well-functioning, competitive markets — for ex-
ample, the paper on which contracts are written, the phone calls with 
which meetings are arranged, or the fences that keep out the uninvited — 
are presumptively irrelevant to efficiency in the sense they will not stand 
in the way of an efficient overall allocation of resources.172  Some inputs, 
however, are not available through competitive markets.  These inputs in-
clude a variety of legal or institutional arrangements that can be under-
stood as past attempts to solve collective action problems, the efficiency of 
which can be independently assessed.  Another important and ubiquitous 
class of inputs into transfer and transfer resistance that is not provided 
through competitive markets is the consent of the relevant rightholders to 
changing or maintaining existing resource access arrangements.  Coercion, 
on which the state holds a monopoly, represents a potential substitute for 
the consent of the parties involved.173 
To take the simplest example, a sale requires the consent of both buyer 
and seller, each of whom holds certain rights (the seller to hold onto her 
property, the buyer to hold onto his money).  That each rightholder has a 
monopoly on her own consent to the transfer creates no difficulty where 
markets are competitive; the consent of some other rightholder will form a 
ready substitute.  Difficulties can arise, however, where the consent of two 
or more specified rightholders is essential in order for a resource to be 
transferred or kept in place.174  In such cases, we would want to know 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 170 See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 49 (7th ed. 2010) (giving a similar example to illus-
trate that not all externalities produce inefficiencies). 
 171 Dahlman likewise examines the relationship between Pareto-relevant and -irrelevant externalities 
and transaction costs, although he does not ultimately distinguish categories of transaction costs along 
these lines.  See Dahlman, supra note 28.  Instead, his analysis seems to set up a choice between circu-
larity (in which transaction costs are built into the constraints pursuant to which optimization takes 
place, so that the world is always deemed to be optimal) and unbounded normativity (in which “exter-
nality” becomes a placeholder for a political view that the government can do the job better than the 
market).  See id. at 152–56.  Dahlman appears to conclude that we can avoid the horns of this dilemma 
by attempting to reduce transaction costs wherever possible.  See id. at 161–62. 
 172 This is not to suggest that these costs have no impact on resource allocation.  They may well 
stand in the way of efficient thing-allocation.  But they do so efficiently, insofar as it is cheaper to con-
serve the resources associated with changing the thing’s allocation than it is to reap the benefits of do-
ing so. 
 173 This coercion could be exercised in a specific setting, as with eminent domain, or it could be 
built into institutional arrangements that allow, for example, a majority to alter zoning rules. 
 174 In a two-party case, there may be a problem of bilateral monopoly.  A multiparty case might be 
styled as an anticommons problem, though it could also arise from circumstances traditionally under-
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whether the input in question (consent to the resource access change) is 
being underproduced as a result of Pareto-relevant, uninternalized external-
ities — that is, whether the fact that parties do not bear all the costs of 
withholding consent has constricted the supply of that input.  If so, the 
next question is whether the government is well positioned to cost-
effectively address that constriction of supply, through coercion or other-
wise.  The answers to these questions may be difficult to discover in a giv-
en case, but as suggested above, we can begin with an easier one: whether 
a collective action problem is present in the story.175 
The fact that an unsolved collective action problem is in the picture 
does not always argue for legal intervention.  Perhaps the problem cannot 
be cost-effectively solved through law or (to put it another way) cannot be 
solved without producing larger negative impacts on other things that are 
connected to the problem at hand.
176
  In particular, we must be mindful of 
how attempts to solve remaining collective action problems can undermine 
existing arrangements that address other collective action problems.
177
  
Nonetheless, the existence of a collective action problem does help to 
identify situations in which the government may have a comparative ad-
vantage over the market in facilitating resource access improvements. 
By contrast, if all the costs in the picture are the product of well-
functioning markets, then it is unlikely that targeted legal interventions are 
warranted.178  This will be the case in many categories of market exchange 
where there is no feasible prospect of altering allocation protocols so as to 
obviate the need for the transactions altogether, and no obvious way in 
which entitlement design interacts with the costs of transacting.  Shoe 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
stood as commons problems.  See Fennell, supra note 50, at 934–37; Demsetz, supra note 19, at 354–
55. 
 175 The collective action problem in question could be a commons or anticommons dilemma sur-
rounding the transfer or retention of specific resources, or it could be a collective action problem that 
impedes innovation in entitlement design or institutions that would solve a recurring set of problems, as 
by making certain transactions unnecessary or providing a protocol for surplus division. 
 176 See COASE, supra note 44, at 25–26 (recognizing this point in the context of contract formali-
ties); Schlag, supra note 8, at 1688–89 (discussing the role of indivisibilities in addressing transaction 
costs). 
 177 This is the essential lesson contained in Rose’s examination of Type I and Type II transaction 
costs.  Rose, supra note 14, at 2184–88.  She critiques Ayres and Talley for not appreciating the way in 
which addressing Type II costs can run up Type I costs by partly dismantling a property system that 
goes a great distance to control (what I here call) coordination costs.  See id. 
 178 Inputs into transfer or transfer resistance that appear efficiency-irrelevant from a static perspec-
tive may be efficiency-relevant when examined from a dynamic perspective or at a higher level of gen-
erality.  Consider a variation on the factory hypothetical above in which neighbors who are bothered by 
the factory’s fumes would collectively gain more than the factory would lose if it stopped emitting, but 
cannot coordinate with each other due to language barriers.  If the market for translators is competitive, 
the prohibitively high cost of transacting would appear efficiency-irrelevant because it does not impede 
the optimal allocation of resources (counting those that would go toward translation).  However, from a 
longer-range perspective and considered at a higher level of generality, changes in education that would 
enable more people in the area to share the same language might be a cost-effective improvement. 
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shopping is again a good example.  There is no feasible way to simply as-
sign me the shoes that I value most highly, and all of the impediments in 
the picture (the distance I must travel to and from the store, the time it 
takes to identify and try on likely shoes, and the queuing and other efforts 
required to complete the purchase) are ones that targeted legal interven-
tions can do relatively little to influence.  Because none of these inputs in-
to would-be transactions represent unsolved collective action problems that 
can be cost-effectively addressed through law, the resulting thing-
misallocation is efficient. 
Legal scholars’ conventional focus on transaction costs has in some 
ways been too narrow, but this analysis shows that it has also been in an-
other way too broad.  Some costs that fall under the heading of transaction 
costs do not make out a good case for legal intervention or even sustained 
scholarly attention.  Yet we presently lack a good vocabulary for distin-
guishing the shoe case from instances in which costs of transacting are 
highly amenable to reduction through legal innovation.  The absence of an 
unsolved collective action problem offers a useful basis for ruling out re-
source access costs that are unlikely to impede overall efficiency. 
IV.  OBJECTIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
There are several objections that might be raised to the approach taken 
here.  Answering these objections suggests some ways in which the analy-
sis might be extended. 
A.  Didn’t We Know All This Already? 
The discussion above has been abstract and conceptual, and it is fair to 
ask how, or if, adopting a resource access costs approach would change the 
way legal scholars think and write about resource problems.  More to the 
point, does the analysis here tell us anything we did not already know?  I 
do not claim to have discovered entirely new ground; many of the points 
raised here can be found in one form or another in scattered places 
throughout the literature.  But the current way of framing the problem of 
resource access runs counter to identifying useful solutions.  Only by 
changing the way we approach the problem can the existing knowledge be 
brought together in a way that legal scholars can use. 
The approach here adds analytic clarity in a manner analogous to other 
significant theoretical advances.  Quite simply, it is possible to do an inef-
ficiently good job of getting entitlements (“things”) to higher valuing us-
ers, or of keeping them there.  The idea of an inefficiently high level of 
law enforcement has been well accepted since Gary Becker’s work on 
crime and punishment.179  Similarly, Calabresi made the possibility of an 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 179 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 170 
(1968) (observing that the question of optimal enforcement can be “[p]ut equivalently, although more 
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inefficiently low level of accidents part of the standard operating equip-
ment for the economic analysis of tort law.180  There should be a similar 
level of familiarity with the possibility of too many efficient thing-
transfers, where too many resources are drawn into the resource-structuring 
process.  Subsuming transaction costs into a broader inquiry into optimali-
ty in resource access helps to make this point intuitive. 
A resource access approach also emphasizes a basic parity among costs 
that is undermined by designating some subset of costs as “transaction 
costs” worthy of special attention.  The costs of moving resources to new 
owners are no more and no less problematic than the costs of keeping 
them in place when they should not be moved, or of altering them in ways 
that make them less useful.  Consider the metaphor of an ice block that 
melts in transit, which economists often use to illustrate transportation or 
transaction costs.181  Suppose we can reduce melt by loading the ice block 
into a speedy transport vehicle or slotting it into well-engineered chutes — 
that is, through intelligent entitlement design and market facilitation.  We 
have made the resource easier to move, but we may not have improved re-
source access.  For example, if we must chop resource units into blocks of 
standard size to ready them for transit, we may end up with resource trans-
fers that look artificially cheap (in melt) if we forget to notice what they 
cost up front (in chop).  We might have been better off with less chop and 
more melt.  We might have been better off forgoing both chop and melt, if 
the surplus associated with the resource’s rearrangement is outstripped by 
the costs of such rearrangement. 
This metaphor relates to a number of current debates in property, in-
cluding the relative merits of property rules and liability rules, and the de-
gree to which property should come in standardized packages.  We should 
be willing to accept less useful property rights in order to make them easi-
er to handle — but only if we gain more than we lose.  Appreciating this 
point turns transaction cost savings from a trump card into a conversation 
starter. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
strangely, [as] how many offenses should be permitted and how many offenders should go unpun-
ished?”). 
 180 See generally CALABRESI, supra note 35. 
 181 See, e.g., Langlois, supra note 14, at 1390 (citing Paul A. Samuelson, The Transfer Problem and 
Transport Costs, II: Analysis of Effects of Trade Impediments, 64 ECON. J. 264 (1954)) (discussing Paul 
Samuelson’s “famous iceberg model of transportation costs” in which “a certain amount of the iceberg 
melts away as it is transported — or, we might add, as it waits around while being exchanged”).  The 
caveat about the resource “waiting” to be exchanged can be extended: a resource capable of throwing 
off a stream of value greater than that which its present possessor can capture has some of its value 
melt away if it is not transferred.  Guarding and other efforts to preserve the resource represent addi-
tional sources of melt. 
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B.  Isn’t This Too Drastic a Departure? 
A converse objection might be that the approach here breaks with exist-
ing approaches too sharply to be realistically adopted at this stage in the 
development of law and economics.  Here, two clarifications are im-
portant.  The first is that this Article’s analysis is not in fundamental disa-
greement with Coase’s approach.  On the contrary, it represents an exten-
sion of that approach.  Coase wrote against the view that the presence of 
an externality means something has gone wrong in a way law can and 
should fix.  Indeed, if transaction costs are zero, Coase correctly observed, 
we can safely draw the opposite conclusion.  Coase never made the con-
verse claim that high transaction costs always evince inefficiency that the 
law can and should address.  Just as we must look behind externalities to 
see if there are impediments to bargaining over them, we must also look 
behind those impediments to see what they are made of and what is caus-
ing them, and whether their magnitude or incidence can be cost-effectively 
reduced.  Some externalities should remain uninternalized (internalizing 
them would cost too much) and some transaction costs should remain pro-
hibitively high (lowering them would cost too much).  Coase’s analysis is 
fully consistent with this observation. 
Because of the nature of his inquiry, Coase emphasized the potential 
for high transaction costs to keep resources from reaching their highest-
valuing users (rather than the potential for transaction cost reducing institu-
tional elements to have the same effect).  He undertook a partial equilibri-
um analysis in which many features (including property rights) were taken 
as given.182  This approach was well suited to his project, but it is not an 
approach that is well suited to the work of legal academics whose job it is 
to pull apart and examine the very variables that interact with the costs of 
transacting in the market.  To say that doing this or that will lower transac-
tion costs is neither here nor there without an analysis of what else hap-
pens to resource access as a result. 
My second clarification returns to the question of terminology.  It may 
seem rather late in the game to tell people to abandon a term, “transaction 
costs,” that is so central to the economic analysis of law.  In fact, I am not 
recommending that the phrase be eliminated from the scholarly vocabulary 
altogether.  It is a perfectly useful stand-in for a whole set of obstacles that 
contribute to thing-misallocation.  The problem arises when this descrip-
tive term is imported into normative analysis without recognizing its limi-
tations.  Once attention turns to questions about what law should do, it be-
comes necessary to use terms that can identify ways to improve resource 
access.  The transaction cost term cannot do this effectively on its own be-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 182 See Oliver E. Williamson, Hierarchies, Markets, and Power in the Economy: An Economic Per-
spective, 4 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 21, 24 (1995) (describing the Coase Theorem as “a partial rather 
than general equilibrium construction”). 
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cause it is beset by problems of underinclusiveness, overinclusiveness, and 
insufficiently specified subcategories.  We can improve the quality and 
precision of the discourse by having terms at hand that help us frame the 
problem of entitlement design appropriately, sift relevant costs from irrele-
vant ones, and distinguish coordination costs from conflict costs. 
C.  Why Maximize Value? 
The analysis in this Article tries to improve how we think and talk 
about the efficiency of resource access.  We would do better to speak more 
precisely about how property arrangements impede or facilitate access to 
resources by high valuers.  But it is also possible to read this Article as a 
first step toward a more radical rethinking of resource access questions.  
By making clear that the real issue is not who gets to own which entitle-
ments, but rather who gets access to which resources, the Article invites a 
deeper questioning of the efficiency inquiry’s reliance on willingness to 
pay. 
The focus on transaction costs has led to a way of thinking about effi-
ciency that uses market transactions as the elusive ideal; it suggests that 
other ways of accomplishing transfers merely stand in for those transac-
tions when they become too costly.  The goal is to mimic the outcomes we 
would get if transactions were not so expensive to produce — outcomes 
that would be determined by willingness to pay.  Once we stop thinking 
about transactions as the prototype and instead examine how to optimally 
arrange access to resources, the question arises of why value (interpreted 
in terms of willingness to pay) should be the right metric. 
The question is a larger one than I can take up here.  But it is interest-
ing that simply moving one step away from a focus on transaction costs 
highlights the distributively conservative character of that focus.  Indeed, 
the use of money as a marker can be viewed as yet another bit of fallout 
from our positive transaction cost world — a stopgap measure that fills in 
as best it can, and at some positive social cost, for transactions based on 
utility alone.183 
To put the point a different way, we might follow Pierre Schlag’s lead 
and consider an alternative to the Coase Theorem that starts with the coun-
terfactual assumption of perfect, costless governmental allocations.184  If 
governmental allocations were costless, it would be possible to directly 
pursue social welfare maximization rather than rely on market alloca-
tions.185  If we then introduced governmental costs into such a world — 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 183 The evolution of money has indeed been understood as a response to transaction costs.  See 
Coase, supra note 93, at 716–17. 
 184 See Schlag, supra note 8, at 1693–97. 
 185 Cheung makes a similar point, observing that “[i]f all transaction costs, broadly defined, were 
truly zero, . . . consumer preferences would be revealed without cost” — a state of affairs that would 
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information costs, political costs, and so on — we might find that using 
markets ended up being a reasonable second-best solution for allocating 
many resources.  But we would count it as a cost of the system, and not a 
benefit, that its method of aggregating information through the price sys-
tem directed resources to high valuers rather than to those who would de-
rive the greatest welfare improvements from the resource.186 
D.  Why Stop at Access? 
I have centered my attention on resource access.  This focus might 
seem to replicate in some ways the problems I identify in this Article.  Just 
as transactions are only one way (and an imperfect and costly way) to 
structure access to resources, so too is resource access merely instrumental 
to the ultimate aim of resource use.  Is something of consequence to legal 
scholars lost by focusing on resource access rather than resource use? 
This question, too, deserves more attention than I can give it here, but a 
few points are worth emphasizing.  We can start with the empirical con-
nection between optimizing access to resources and optimizing resource 
use.  There are two facets to this connection: the degree to which access is 
a necessary precondition to optimal resource use, and the degree to which 
access is sufficient to induce optimal resource use. 
Access is sometimes necessary to optimal resource use in a visceral 
and clear-cut way.  If a given berry is best used as nutrition for Jed, it will 
be impossible for it to be deployed in that way without getting the berry 
into Jed’s stomach, which requires giving Jed access to the berry.  In other 
cases, access is a practical necessity because the costs of arranging optimal 
resource use in its absence are too high.  Lloyd Cohen gives the example 
of a department-store developer who would not need to worry about a 
holdout retaining ownership (or, presumably, physical possession) of a 
corner of the planned store’s footprint if it were feasible to contract over 
this resource’s optimal use — here, as a seamlessly attached segment of 
the store.187  These two examples together suggest that access by high-
valuing end users is essential to optimal resource use, but access by parties 
involved in producing value for end users is only instrumental to that goal.  
Whether to grant producers of value something less than physical access to 
inputs or something more (such as formal property rights) is thus an open 
and contingent question. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
permit optimality to be achieved from any sort of institutional arrangement.  CHEUNG, supra note 66, 
at 37–38. 
 186 Schlag makes a related point when he observes that focusing on a costless market transaction “is 
really an invitation to look at certain forms of information . . . [that] a market produces such as prices, 
payments, outputs, etc.” and “to disregard other types of information — notably the kind that the gov-
ernment obtains such as votes, protests, expertise, etc.”  Schlag, supra note 8, at 1695. 
 187 Cohen, supra note 50, at 351–53. 
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Further, it is clear that access will not always be sufficient to ensure 
optimal resource use, whether in production or consumption.  The step 
from resource access to resource use requires the essential ingredients of 
human effort and choice.  By and large, the law can only structure access 
to resources and set up incentive systems; it cannot directly compel us-
es.188  The law can grant Jed access to a berry patch, but he must decide to 
pick the berries; it can grant him a bowl of berries, or a voucher for ber-
ries, but he must take additional steps to wring nutrition out of this ar-
rangement.189  Even when the government “itself” engages in a use, like 
using land for a highway, it is really only structuring access to the land, the 
paving equipment, and so on, and giving its human agents incentives to 
use these resources in a particular way.  It is not without justification, then, 
for law to focus on access, the tractable margin, rather than on inputs that 
it cannot directly control. 
Nonetheless, the gap between access and use is an interesting one for 
law, and it should not be neglected in examining how entitlement struc-
tures and other incentive systems operate.  This Article has pursued an in-
strumental view of transactions that casts them as part of a larger set of re-
source access structures that includes, but is not limited to, private property 
rights.  Access, in turn, may be viewed instrumentally as well.  As 
Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales have shown, access can be used to 
elicit optimal investments in the absence of property rights, and sometimes 
this arrangement can dominate the residual rights associated with owner-
ship.190  Here, access to production factors creates incentives that, ulti-
mately, improve access to consumption items by end users.  But end users 
too may require encouragement to use resources optimally. 
Informal or nonpecuniary methods of persuasion or coercion may be-
come important in translating access into use.  For example, rather than 
regulate access to water directly, the law might try to convince people that 
using too much water is shameful.  This would be an indirect method of 
trying to secure access to water for other users, or later versions of the 
same users.  Likewise, access to healthy foods or opportunities for exercise 
may be accompanied by exhortations to make use of these resources.  
Viewing access instrumentally thus opens up new lines of inquiry.  For ex-
ample, some resource access structures might require more norms-creation 
work than others to achieve the ultimate end of optimizing use.  If so, we 
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 188 To be sure, the law frequently rewards and penalizes use and nonuse, and thereby influences how 
resources are used and not merely how they are accessed.  But these legal approaches really come 
down to a set of rules about how people gain and lose access to resources (whether the resources that 
they are being encouraged to use or not use, or other resources that the state presents as incentives).  
The government can also strongly encourage certain kinds of uses by removing alternatives. 
 189 See Noah D. Zatz, Poverty Unmodified? Critical Reflections on the Deserving/Undeserving Dis-
tinction, 59 UCLA L. REV. 550, 573–74 (2012) (discussing what it means for a resource like bread to 
be “available”). 
 190 See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 103. 
FENNELL - CLEAN BOOKPROOFS CORRECTED 03/08/13 – 12:57 PM 
58 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 126:1 
might explore how these norms, and their supporting structures, produce 
costs or benefits for society.191 
CONCLUSION 
Regardless of exactly how the term is understood, “transaction costs” 
does a poor job of focusing legal scholars’ attention in all, and only, the 
right places.  If transaction costs are worthy of special attention from legal 
scholars, it must be because they relate in some important way to legal 
processes, structures, entitlements, or institutions — dials that the law can 
twist.  But if that is our criterion for paying special attention — legal re-
mediability or tractability — then our attention must extend not just to the 
cost of transactions (however defined), but also to the costs of doing things 
through law that make transactions less costly or less necessary.  Rather 
than taking center stage on their own, then, transaction costs are one of 
several cost factors implicated by resource access arrangements, and trans-
actions are only one of several ways of structuring resource access.  At the 
same time, there is no reason to focus attention on costs that cannot be 
cost-effectively reduced through the law’s dial-twisting, or to twist dials 
that are disconnected from the real problems at hand. 
To address the problems of underinclusion, overinclusion, and insuffi-
cient specification that have plagued the use of the transaction cost catego-
ry, it is first necessary to widen our lens to take in all the costs of structur-
ing access to resources.  The next step is to usefully subdivide this set of 
costs to home in on places where targeted legal interventions can improve 
resource access.  Emphasizing the distinction between conflict and coordi-
nation costs better frames the tradeoffs in entitlement design.  Likewise, 
the distinction between costs that are and are not produced by collective 
action problems helps to focus attention on the improvements for which 
property design has a comparative advantage. 
Instead of reading Coase’s analysis as a directive to “use the law to lu-
bricate private bargaining,”192 property scholars should be concerned with 
improving access to resources — including those resources that must be 
used to structure access to other resources.  With the approach presented 
here, I hope to have made a start toward that goal. 
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 191 Cf. Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: Charting the Incomplete Institutionalism, 98 GEO. L.J. 
863 (2010) (critiquing the “incomplete institutionalism” of law and economics and urging greater atten-
tion to the internal responses of firms to transaction costs). 
 192 Cooter, supra note 41, at 14. 
